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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
)

RALPH OSTLER,

)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1

)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs .
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

)

)

Case No:

)
)

Respondents.

---------------------------)--------------------------Pursuant

to

Rules

46

and

49

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari to review that portion of the unpublished
Court of Appeals' opinion entered on August 5, 1991, where in the
Court

of

Appeals

ruled

that

it

did

not

have

jurisdiction

to

consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.

1 Ostler has a lso filed a Petition for writ of Mandamus.
issues in both petitions overlap.
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III.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The
Ostler,

parties

to

and respondents,

this

proceeding

are

Albina Transfer Co.,

petitioner Ralph
Inc.,

F & R Roe,

Inc., Stanley Wheeler.
IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does an appellate court have jurisdiction to consider an
uncontested Motion to Recall the Mandate,

particularly when the

motion is filed in response to a petition for sanctions?
V.
OPINIONS BELOW
The

official

unpublished

opinion

is

attached

in

the

Appendix.
VI.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The date of the decision sought to be reviewed is August
5, 1991.

The statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the

Utah Supreme Court to review the decision are:
Utah Const. Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 4.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2,

(3) (a) and (5).

1

VII.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provisions are U.R.A.P.
Utah Const.

Art.

VIII,

§

Utah Code Ann.,

3,

§

78-2-4.

46,

Copies

attached in the Appendix .
VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup
driven

by

Ostler's

emergency lane.

father

a

truck

parked

in

the

Ostler was a passenger in the pickup.

father was the driver.
truck.

and

highway
Ostler's

Respondent Wheeler was the driver of the

Wheeler's employers are respondents Albina Transfer Co.,

Inc. and F & R Roe, Inc.
As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries.
not walk.

Ostler does

He is painfully confined to a wheel chair.
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked

the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the
respondents on the issue of negligence.
trial.

However, Ostler lost at

The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct

was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries.
The
(Appendix 1).

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

upheld

the

trial

court.

Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing
2

with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) and thereafter a petition
for certiorari with this Court.

(Appendix 3).

petitions,

Affidavit

Ostler

filed

the

In support of the

of

Patricia

Hanna,

chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of
Utah ("Hanna affidavit")

(Appendix 4) .

After both petitions were denied,

respondents filed a

Motion for sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals .
alleged

that

the

petition

for

rehearing,

the

The motion

petition

for

certiorari and the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and
(Appendix 5).

contrary to U.R.C.P. 11.

Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for
Sanctions.

(Appendix 6).

Ostler's memorandum was supported by

affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College
of Law (Thurman), the former Dean of the Brigham Young University
College of

Law

(Hawkins),

Evidence (Goldsmith).

and a

nationally known professor of

(See Appendices 7, 8, 9).

However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the
Motions for Sanctions.

Based upon the same aff idavi ts,

affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate.
Faced

with

the

affidavits

of

Ostler

(Appendix 10) .

Thurman,

Hawkins

and

Goldsmith, the respondents elected not to file any memorandum in
opposition to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.

3

In a three page unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals
denied the respondents' Motion for Sanctions.

The Court of Appeals

also denied the Motion to Recall the Mandate.

(Appendix 11).

Only

one sentence was devoted to Ostler's Motion To Recall the Mandate:
we deny the
(FJor lack of jurisdiction .
motions to recall mandate and to supplement
the response to the petition.
Ostler ,timely petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a

writ

Of .£~I':tJ ~,~ I

IX.
ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction.
The statutory considerations for granting certiorari are

as follows:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a
decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in
the way that is in conflict with a decision of
the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the supreme Court's power of
supervision; or

4

(d)
When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the supreme Court.
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
B.

The Court of Appeals' Rul i ng
Decisions of this Court.

is

in

Conflict

with

Prior

without analysis or citation of authority , the Utah Court
of Appeals, in a one sentence opinion, ruled that appellate courts
do not have jurisdiction to recall a mandate.

The decision is

contrary to the actions of this Court in Fenton v . Salt Lake Co.,
4 Utah 116 (1885).

In Fenton, the Utah Supreme Court effectively

granted a motion to recall the mandate (without using the name).
The ruling is also contrary to Miller v. Southern Pacific
Co . , 24 P.2d 380 (Utah 1933).

In Miller, the Utah Supreme Court

ruled that an appellate court can recall a remitter if it "was
improperly, or to correct an irregularity or error in

issued .

the issuance of the remitter.
C.

"

The Court of Appe a ls' Ruling Conflicts with Another Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App.

1988),

the

Court

of

Appeals

ruled

that

a

trial

court

has

jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from a judgment even
after a notice of appeal is filed .

The Baker decision is pre-

dicated on the concept that the court has jurisdiction to review,
5

correct or amend its judgment or order after the case has been
placed with another court.
vision Corp. v.

F.C.C.,

463,

See generally, Greater Boston TeleF.2d 268,

The Baker court held that a court does.
this case, held that it does not.

276-77

(D.C.

Cir.

1971).

The Court of Appeals, in

certiorari should be granted to

resolve the conflict.
D.

Whether Appellate Courts have Jurisdiction to Recall a Mandate
is an Important Ouestion of State Law Which Should be Settled
by the Supreme Court.
The Utah Supreme Court is charged with determining the

extent of its own appellate jurisdiction and the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals.

It is also charged with

constructing the rules of appellate procedure.
VIII, § 3: Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-4).

(Utah Const. Art.

This case presents the court

with the opportunity to clarify the law regarding motions to recall
the mandate.
Appellate courts have inherent power or jurisdiction to
recall and review their own judgments, mandates, and orders.

This

is so even if the motion was filed after the time allowed for a
petition for rehearing,
denied.

or even if a petition for rehearing was

See Cahill v. N.Y., N,H, & Hartford R.R . Co., 351 U.S. 183

(1956); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954
(N.M. 1984); Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968); Reimers
v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954); Lindus v.
6

Northern Insurance Co. of N.Y., 438 P.2d 311 (Ariz. 1968); Chapman
v.

st.

Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church,

1932); Gondeck v.

Pan American World Airways,

138 So.

630

(Fla.

Inc. / 382 U.S.

25

(1965) .
As

the

Tenth

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals

explained

in

Coleman v. Turpin, 827 F.2d 667 (loth Cir. 1987):
[A]n appellate court has power to set aside at
any time a mandate
to prevent an
injustice or to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process.
Id. at 671.
The appellate court's power or jurisdiction to recall its
mandate and reconsider its decision exists regardless of whether
there is a rule or statute specifically authorizing the court to do
so.

~,

Yonadi v. Homestead county Homes,

1956); see Boudar v.

EG&G Inc.,

742 P.2d 491

127 A.2d 198
(N.M.

(N.J.

1987).

The

basis for this rule is that:
[T]he interest in finality of litigation must
yield where the interests of justice would
make unfair the strict application of
rules.
united States v. Ohio Power Co./ 353 U.S. 98, 100 (1957).
An appellate court's inherent jurisdiction or power to
recall the mandate springs from English equity common law jurisprudence.

The United States Supreme Court,

in holding that a

Circuit Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction, power, and duty to
recall its mandate and vacate its earlier judgment explained:
7

From the beginning there has existed.
. a
rule of equity to the effect that under
certain circumstances
relief will be
granted against judgments regardless of the
terms of their entry. Marine Insurance Co. v.
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332; Marshall v. Holmes, 141
U.S. 589. This equity rule, which was firmly
established in English practice long before
the foundation of our Republic . . . developed
and
fashioned
to
fulfill
a
universally
recognized need for correcting injustices
which,
in certain instances,
are deemed
sufficiently gross to demand a departure from
rigid adherence to term rules.

* * *
It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to
relieve hardships which, from time to time,
ar~se
from a hard and fast adherence to
another court-made rule, the general rule that
judgments should not be disturbed after the
term of their entry has expired.
Created to
avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this
equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to meet
new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct particular injustices .

* * *
We think that when this court, a century ago,
approved this practice and held that federal
appellate courts have the power to pass upon,
and hence to grant or deny, petitions for
bills of review even though the petitions be
presented
long
after
the
term
of
the
challenged judgment has expired, it settled
the procedural question here involved.
Hazel- Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244,
248-49 (1944).
By statute, Utah adopted the Common Law of England:

8

The Common Law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to,
or in conflict with,
the
constitution or laws of the united states, or
the constitution or laws of this state, and so
far only as it is consistent with and adopted
to the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessity of the people hereof,
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision
in all
courts of this
state.
(Emphasis added).
Ut a h Code Ann. § 68- 3 -1 (1953 as amended) .
In this case,

the Court of Appeals,

in one sentence,

ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to
Recall the Mandate. That ruling implies that its prior defective
decision must stand.

However:

[Appellate decisions 1 must be final because
they are right, and not right because they are
final, even if we must take the untoward
action of acknowledging our incorrect limitation of the issues presented to us on previous
rehearing.
Boudar, supra at 443.
Applying statutory principles similar to the common law
principles described above,
decision

effectively

the Utah

granted

a

Supreme Court

motion

(although without using the name).

to

recall

in an 1885
the

mandate

Fenton v . Salt Lake Co., 4 Utah

116 (1885).
More recently,

the Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that a

trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from
a

judgment even after a

notice of
9

appeal

is filed.

Baker v .

Western Surety Co.,

757 P . 2d 878

(Utah App.

1988) .

The Baker

decision is based on the idea that a trial court has jurisdiction
to review,

correct and amend its own judgments.

see generally,

Baker at 880-81i Greater Boston Television Corp.
F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

v.

F . C. C.,

463

However, the Court of Appeals failed to

recognize that it has the same inherent power to review its own
decisions that the trial court had in Baker, supra.
E.

The opinions of the Court of Appeals Departs From the Accepted
Course of Judicial Proceedings .
The

affidavits

of

Thurman,

Hawkins

and

Goldsmith

(Appendices 7, 8, 9) show that there has been a grave miscarriage
of justice in this case.

According to Dean Samuel Thurman: "In

Ostler proximate cause should have been directed by the trial
court."

(Appendix 7 at p. 4).

According to Dean Hawkins:

"The

opin i on of the Court of Appeals obscures the basic legal question
as to the scope of liability.
Also, Dean Hawkins states:

(Appendix 8 at para. 3).

"

"Thus, by this line of analysis,

the

trial court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff on the
issue

of

causation

negligence."

as

well

as

on

(Appendix 8 at para.

the
7).

issue

of

defendant's

According to Professor

Goldsmith : " . . . The published opinion committed serious error in
at least two critical respects.

"

(Appendix 9 at para. 15).

Professor Goldsmith's affidavit also directs the court's attention
to the following comments of Justice Jackson:
10

But if I haver agreed to any prior decision
which forecloses what now seems to be a
sensible construction of this Act, I must
frankly admit that I was unaware of it.
Under these circumstances, except for any
personal humiliation involved in admitting
that I do not always understand the opinions
of this Court, I see no reason why I should be
consciously
wrong
today
because
I
was
unconsciously wrong yesterday.
Massachusetts v .
(Jackson, J.).

united

states,

333

U. S.

611,

639-40

(1948)

On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated:
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by
which a judge may recede from a prior opinion
that has proven untenable. . . . But an escape
less self-depreciating was taken by Lord
Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a barrister's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed
that a man of my intelligence should have been
guilty of giving such an opinion."
If there
are other ways of gracefully and good naturedly surrendering former views to a better
considered position, I invoke them all.
McGrath v . Kristensen, 340 U.S . 162, 177-7 8 (1950)

(Jackson, J.).

However, a threshold issue may be whether such affidavits
are

appropriate.

It

is

important

to

note

that

the

expert

aff idav i ts came into this case as a defensive measure.

After

Wheeler won his case in the trial court and the appellate courts,
he petitioned the Court of Appeals for sanctions.

Specifically,

Wheeler urged that Ostler's petition for certiorari and the Hanna
affidavit were frivolous and in bad faith.
The only way Ostler could show that the petition and
affidavit were

not

frivolous

was
11

by

obtaining affidavits

from

experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics
(Thurman).

Thus, Wheeler's motion for sanctions triggered the need

for the expert affidavits.
The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of
Appeals.

Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits

of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however,
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be
recalled.
Therefore, granting
for

the use of

ceedings.

~_ --h
\
c:et"1/01'tt1'"1

,u..""laJDl:I:g' will

such expert affidavits

not open the floodgates

in other appellate pro-

This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits

(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively.

x.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for certiorari should be granted .

DATED this

.=3- day

of

_~~""Jf-"-'--'___ ,

1991.

ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
r Petitioner

12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Ostler v. Albina, et
al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this
1991 to the following:
M. Dayle Jeffs

JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

0566-162.1\jn
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Appendix 1
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Appendix 4
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Appendix 5

Respondent's Motion for sanctions
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Appendix 14
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APPENDIX 1

Cite ... :-71=> 1 f.2d ~5 (Uah App . 1989)

tion , claiming that the Jangu:l...Z.e, is confu::ing and incomplete. Plaint
sought to
further define and expand the gi\'en in ·
struction. While it is true, as plaintiff ar·
gues, that jury instructions should be
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in
lay people's language without belaboring
definitions," Johnson v. CO)'1l1mll Ware ·
house Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25
(1965), the adoption of plaintiff's suggestions would have run counter to this rule.
Although we cannot asce rtain from the
record the rationale behind the trial court's
o\'erruling of plaintiff's objections, any ex·
pansion of the given instruction would ha\'e
likely hindered, ra ther than enhanced, the
jury's compreh ens ion of the issue.
The chall enged instruction must also be
considered in the context of the instruc'
tions as a whole. Madsen v. BToUln, 701
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Utah 1985) ; S/.ate v.
Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981).
Oth er instructions propose plaintiff's thea·
ry of the case, i.e., " concurrent negligence," and add meaning to the instruction
at issue. Although plaintiff contends that
the jury believed that causation meant
"fault," he fails to support this supposition.
We cannot delve into the jury's reasoning
process, and cannot speculate what
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident.
However, it is just as reasonable to presume, as in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah 1981), that the jury determined that the degree of Stephen Ostler's
inattentiven ess was not foreseeable . Thus,
"he failed to observe the s itu ation he
should ha\'e ... [and] this later negligent
act became the sole proximate cause of the
collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed to
show that any alleged confusion was substantial an d prejudicial, we reject plaintiff's
claim of error.

A mOLion for a directcli..xe rdict requires
the tri al court to consi .
the evidence in
the light ' most favorable to the party
against whom it is directed. Th e case
should not be taken from the jury wh ere
there is substantial dispute in the evidence. . .. On appeal, this Court applies
the same rules.
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assors.,
Inc. 1.'. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah
19831.
The trial court resen'ed the issue of
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict
that Wheeler was negli gent. "Proximate
cause" is one of the essential elements of a
negligence action, see William.s t·. Mel by,
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and is specifically "that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred." Mitchell v. PeaTson En teTS., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). Proximate causation is generally a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. Watters, 626 P.2d at 457- 58.
[lO] The trial court denied plaintiff's
motions for a directed verdict on the issue
of causation. Under the applicable standard of review, we are required to view the
e\'idence in defendants' favor. That evidence, tending to establish that proximate
cause was not only in substantial dispute,
but was the very essence of the contronrsy between the parties, indicates that the
trial court properly declined to remove the
issue from the jury. We find no error in
the ruling below.

In conclus ion, none of plaintiff's claims
constitute reversible error. We have reviewed other issues raised by plaintiff and
find th em to be without merit. The judgment is affirmed.

DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION
We last address plaintiffs argument that
the trial court erred in not directing a verdict of proximate cause as a matter of law .
Our re\'iew of a challenge to the denial of a
motion for a directed verdict is governed by
the standard described in Penrod l '. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987):

GREENWOOD and JACKSOK, JJ.,
concur.
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It is unnecessary to resoh'e this argu ·
ment wh en the alternate basis for the
court's r uling is considered, namely, that
the question of how long Wheeler had been
parked ultil1latel,' went to the issue of
Wheeler's negligence. Since that issue had
been res olved by directed verdict, the ex·
cluded t.estimony was irrele\'ant. Similar·
Iy, plaintiff claims that he was not permit·
ted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's
"prior bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's vi·
olation of federal motor carrier regulations.
These acts also concerned the issue of
\I'heeler's neglig ence and were properly ex·
eluded.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Plaintiff complains of statements
made by defense counsel du ring closing
argument. Defense counsel made the fol·
lowing remark:
This case is to decide whether Wheele r,
... F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for
the injuries to Ralph, when Wheeler's
actions were not the cause of the acci·
dent.
(7)

Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out
of the presence of the jury. He now ar·
gues that the statement was improper,
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that
"any recovery would come from the insur·
ance carrier," and that the remark unfairly
implies that defendants would personally
pay any damage award.
We are not convinced that there is an)'
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it
reDects the fact that judgment would be
rendered against the various defendants
under joint and se\'eral liability, and does
not indicate the source of funds to pay such
a judgment. It does not inappropriately
state that insurance would or would not
pay any judgment, see l'tah R.E\·id. 4!l,
thus improperly eliciting sympathy or tem·
pering the size of any award. Cf Priel ".
R.E.D., inc., 392 N. \\·.2d 65 (l\.D.1986)
("We are talking about mone y that my
client will ha\'e to pa y out of his Ole?/.
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude
that the remark was not unfairly preju·
dicial.

[8) P laintiff also objected to the follow·
ing portion of defendants' closing argu·
ment:
[T)he foreseeability question is: How
was Stan Wheeler expected t.o foresee
that at that precise time if, as Me. DeBry
said, one in a billion chances that it
would happen right at that particular
timePlaintiff argues that this was a misstate·
ment of the law because "foreseeability
relates to whether accidents of this general
nature might happen." He further asserts
that the statemellt was prejudicial and that
"[t)he only explanation for [the) verdict is
that the jury was confused by [defense
counsel's) misstatements of the law."
We disagree. El'en if counsel's remarks
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact
appears to be negated by the court's ad·
monishment:
The Jury is directed to look at the Instructions. They set forth the law in
that regard. Statement of counsel is to
be disregarded except as it is accurate.
See Hall t'. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error
shown where court admonished jury follow·
ing remarks during closing argument).
When considered in the context of the en·
tire closing argument, plaintiff's objection,
and the court's admonition, we conclude
there was no unfair prejudice . See gener·
ally Halford 1'. Yandell, 558 S.\\, .2d 400,
41H2 (Mo .Ct.App.1977).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff further assigns as error two
jury instructions. The first instruction in·
\'oh'ed the placement of emergency warn ·
ing devices behind Wheeler's parked truck.
\Ve agree that the gi\'en instruction signifi·
cantl)' differed f"0111 plaintiff's requested
instruction. Howe\'er, the instru ction can·
cerned the issue of Wheeler's negligence.
We have already est3blished that this issue
had been taken from the jury. Any error
could not hal'e affected the substantial
rights of plaintiff, and was, therefore,
harmless.
[9) Plaintiff also objects to the trial
court's instruction on the issue of cause.·

(
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It is unnecessary to resolve this argument when the alternate basis for the
court's ruling is considered, namely, that
the question of how long Wheeler had been
parked ultimately went to the issue of
Wheeler's negligence. Since that iss ue had
been resolved by directed verdict, the excluded testimony was irrel e'-ant. Similarly, plaintiff claims that he was not permitted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's
"prior bad acts ," specifically , Wheeler's ,-ialation of federal motor carrier regulations.
These acts also concerned the issue of
Wheeler's negligence and were properly excl uded.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
[7] Plaintiff complains of statements
made by defense counsel during closing
argument. Defen,e counsel made the following remark:
This case is to decide whet her Wheeler,
.. _ F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for
the injuries to Ra lph, when Wheeler's
actions were not the cause of t he accident.
Plaintiff timely resen-ed an objection out
of the presence of the jury. He now argues that the Sl<1temtnt was improper,
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that
"any recovery would come from the insurance car rier," and that the remark unfairly
implies that defenda nts would personally
pay any damage award.
We are not convinced that there is any
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it
r eflects the fact tha t judgment would be
rendered against the various defendants
under joint and several liability, and does
not indicate th e source of fun ds to pay such
a judgment. It does not in approp riatel y
state that insurance would or would not
pay any judgment, see Ctah R.E,-id. 411,
thus improperly eliciting sym pathy or tempering the size of any award. Cj P,-iel 1'.
R.E.D_, inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D .laS6)
("We are l<1lking about money that my
client will have to payo ut of his OIL'n
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude
that the remark was not unfairly prejudicial.

[8 ] Plaintiff al so objected to the following portion of defendants' closing argument:
[T]he foreseeability question is: How
was Stan Wheeler expected to foresee
t hat at that precise time if, as Mr. DeBry
said, one in a billion chances that it
would happen ri ght at that particular
time-

Plaintiff argues that this was a mis statement of the law because "foreseeability
r elates to wh ethe r acc idents of th is general
natu re might happen." He further asserts
that the statement was prejudicial and that
"[t]he only explanation for [the] ,- erdict is
that the jury was confused by [defense
counsel' s] misstateme nts of the law."
We disagree . Even if counsel's remarks
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact
appears to be negated by the court's admonishment:
The Jury is directed to look at the Instructions. They set forth the law in
that regard. Statement of counsel is to
be disregarded except as it is accurate.
See Hall v_ Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error
shown where court admonished jury follow ing remarks during closing argument).
When considered in the context of the entire closing argument, plaintiff's objection,
and the court's admonition, we conclude
the re was no unfair prejudice. See generally Ha lford t'. Yandell, 55S S.W_2d 400,
411 -12 ( ~!0. CL-\pp.1977 ) .
J UR Y IN STRUCTIONS
Plaintiff fur t her assigns as error two
jury instructions. The first instru ction involved the placement of emergency warning de,-ices behind Wheeler's parked truck.
We agree that the given instruction sign ificantly differed from plaintiffs req uested
instruction. However , the in struction con·
ce rned t he issue of Wh eele r 's negligence.
We have already established that this issue
had been taken from the ju ry. Any error
could not have affected the substantial
rights of plaintiff. and was, therefore,
hal-mless.
[9] Plaintiff also objects to the trial
cou r t's ins truction on the issue of causa-

It appears, howne r, that tf. ~onditions of
the fi lm 's production were 1.' . from similar
to the actual accident. The differences in
lighting and driver alertness and skill were
crucial. The literal controversy of this lawsuit is the inexplicable departure of a vehicle from the lane of traffic. The videotape does not, and cannot, depict the conditions that caused that departure. Any other depiction is, as the trial court concluded,
not reconstruction, but speculation. In
contrast to Whitehead, the circumstances
of this accident are not known, and there is
no indication that the design characteristics
of vehicles were responsible. The discrepancies between the film and plaintiff's accident seem to go beyond weight. Since the
film would not "make the existence of any
fact ... of consequence.. more probable
than not" under Utah R.Evid. 401, we are
not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the
first two prongs of similarity and relevance
under the Whitehead test.

Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our
doubt as to the film's relevance and similarity, we conclude that, in any event, the trial
court properly excluded the videotape as
substantive evidence on the grounds of potential confusion_ See Utah R.Evid. 403.
Under Whitehead 's third prong, such evidence may be excluded in the court's discretion even if it is re levant, when a determination is made that it may confuse or
mislead. 101 Utah Adv.Rep. at 31 (trial
court upheld although unclear whether
court excluded evidence under rule 401 or
403, either theory of excl usion being proper). Since plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the finding of potential confusion was
an abuse of the court's discretion, we hold
that the videotape was properly excluded.
[5] We last address plaintiff's claim of
error regarding the exclusion of evidence
on federal motor carrier reg ulations and
road safety and design. Plaintiff argues
that this evidence was relevant to the issue
of foreseeability under his theory of concurrent negligence. Pla intiff quotes Codesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541,
545-46 (Utah 1984):

The law does not nf ' -'S arily recognize
only one proximate \.. _ ... se of an injury,
consisting of only one factor, one act, or
the conduct of only one person. To the
contrary, the acts and omissions of two
or more persons may work concurrently
as the efficient cause of an injury, and in
such a case, each of the participating
acts or omissions is regard ed in law as a
proximate cause and both may be held
responsible.
We have examined the reco rd and agree
that some of this e\'idence rna)' be relevant
to the issue of foreseeability. Other evidence goes to the issue of Whee ler's negligence, a matter previou sly decided by directed verdict, and may be excluded as
irrelevant. See Utah R.Ev id . 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). The coun excluded the relevant
portions of the expert's proffered testimony on the grounds that such evidence
would not be particularly helpful to the
jury. The court believed that the jury was
as capable as the expert to make the determination of foreseeability. We agree, in any
event, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden
of showing that the claimed error was substantial and _prejudicial. See Ashton v.
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987);
Utah R.Civ.P . 6l. In the absence of such a
showing, we consider plaintiff's claim to be
without merit.

nrPEACHME:\T
[6] Plaintiff argues that the court's refu sal to permit him to sho\\' that Wheeler
may have been parked on the shoulder of
the highway for as long as thirty minutes
unduly restricted cross-examination. Al though plaintiff concedes that the trial
judge has broad discretion in regulating
the scope of such testimony , see, e.g.,
Whit ehead, 101 Utah Adv.Rep. at 28, he
claims that the court abused its discretion by
misapplying the law. Plaintiff claims that he
was attempting to show consistency with
prior deposition testimony, and the court
rul ed that only prior inconsistent statements
may be compared.
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Even if such a theory is admissible under
the threshold requirement of inherent reliability, see Stale 1'. Rim masch, 775 P.2d
388, 398-99 (Utah 1989), the theory is
premised on the fact that a driver must be
awake in order to be so "lured." Plain·
tiff's o\\'n expert admitted that there \\'as
no conclusive way to determine Stephen
Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
accident. Nor does the theory necessarily
establish causation because plaintiff's ex·
pert conceded that none of the facto rs trig·
gering the moth phenomenon were pro\·en.
Without this foundation, the court deter·
mined that the expert testimony on the
moth phenomenon would not be helpful to
the jury, and furthermore, that it would
be prejudicial to present an opinion based
on such pure conjecture.
This is consistent with the principle that
"any expert evidence, scientifically b,,:sed
or otherwise " must, on balance, "be helpful
to the trier of fact." Id. at 398 n. 8. Such
evidence must be scrutinized carefully to
avoid the "tendency of the finde r of fact to
abandon its responsibility to decide the critical issues and simply adopt the judgment
of the expert despite an inability to accurately appraise the validity of the underlying science." Id. at 396. Whether the
probative value of e\'idence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a
det.e rmination within the sound discretion
of the trial COUI·t. State v. Johnson, 115
Utah Adv.Rep. at 9. Under rules 403 and
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we con·
clude that the trial judge was \\'ithin his
discretion to exclude the testimony.
[ ~) Similarly, the trial court concluded
that plaintiff's videotaped demonstration
was more apt to be confusing to the jury
than helpful. The videotape depicted a
compact pickup truck driving off the roadway at the actual accident location. It
purported to show that no mishap would
have occurred had Wheeler's truck not
been parked on the road shoulder. Plaintiff first argu es that the videotape was for
illustrative purposes and \\'as proper under
.Hillers Nat 'f IllS. Co. ·v. Wichita Fiollr
.If/lis Co., 25i F.2d 93 (10th Cir.1958) and

other cases. It is ob\' ious, howeve r, that
the film did not illustrate the accident, but
rather portrayed plaintiff's prediction of
Hents under a different set of facts. As
such, the potential for unfair prejudice as
illustrati\'e e\'idence was significant, and
the trial court was within its discretion to
exclude it.
Plaintiff alternati\'ely argues that the
videotape was admissible as e\'idence.
Plaintiff cites DiRosario 1'. Harens, 196
Cal..-\pp.3d 1~24, 242 Cal.Rptr. 423 (1987)
for the proposition that experimental e\'idence is admissible provided it is conducted
under substantially similar conditions as
that of the actual incident. "The standard
that must be met in determining whether
the proponent of the experiment has met
the burden of proof oi establishing the
preliminary fact essential to the admissibility of the experimental evidence is whether
the conditions were substantially identical,
not absolutely identical." Id. 242 Cal.Rptr.
at 426 (quoting Culpepper v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 33 Cal.App.3d 510, 521.
109 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1973)). DiRosa,.io im·
poses two other requirements- that the ex·
perimental evidence be relevant and not
consume undue time , confuse the issues, or
mislead the jury. Id. 242 Cal.Rptr. at 426.
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales
Corp., 101 Utah Adv .Rep. 27 (1989), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed the Clllpepper th r ee·prong test in determining the admissibility of motor vehicle crash test films.
The court upheld the admission of the films
into e\'idence and held that certain discrepancies between the films and the actual accident went to weight, rathe r than adm issibility. The circumstances of the accident were
known and the films were offered to show
the handling characteristics of similar vehi·
cles.
In this case, application of the lVhitchead test supports exclusion of the evidence. Pbintiff admits that the videotape
differed from the actual accident in that
the videotape was produced during daylight conditions and employed an alert, profes sional stunt dri\'er. He further argues
that e\'en with these discrepancies, the
demonstration was substantially similar.

verdict for defendants. P lointiff appeals
from the \'erdict, alleging n .erous errors.
VOIR DIRE
[ I ) We first address plaintiff's claim
that jury voir dire was inadequate to re \'eal
bias related to a "tort refo rm" advertising
campaign conducted by a national insur·
ance company. It is obvious from the trial
transcript that the gist of plaintiff's question s went to th e issue of potential juror
bias against large monetary awards.

Rule 47 (a) of the Utah Rule s of Civil
Procedure requires the court to permit the
parties to supplement voir dire with questions that are material and prope r. However , the court has considerable discretion
to "contain voir dire within reasonable limits." Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932-33 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). Whether that discretion has
been abused is determined from the totality
of the questioning. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d
456, 457-58 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
In lieu of plaintiffs proposed questions,
the judge informed the venire that plaintiff's claim may exceed a million dolla r s
and asked if any would object to an award
of thal magnitude . None did. The judge
also asked if any of the prospective jurors
believed that people should not resort to
the courts to settle disputes or recover
damages for injuries . Again, none did.
The judge followed with a question asking
whether any believed they were incapable
of rendering a fair and true verdict based
on the eyidence. None responded affirmatively. In their totality, and in context
with the remainder of voir dire, these ques·
tio ns are substantively responsi ve to plaintiff's concerns and appear sufficient to r eveal "tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown an abuse of
discretion in the court's voir dire of prospective jurors .
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly rejected his evid ence on the iss ue
of proximate cause, resulting in prejudicial
erro r . All of t his evidence was in the form

of profiered testimon}r' " om t wo experts.
The excluded evidence, ered a variety of
topics, including a sc ientific theory referred
to as the "moth phenomenon," certain fe deral motor carrier regula tion s, road sa fety
and des ign, and a videotape prepared for
plaintiff that purported to show wha t
wo uld ha\'e happened if the semitrailer had
not been unlawfully pa rked.
(2) The general rule rega rding the admis sion or exclusion of evidence is that the
tria l court's decision will not be o\'erturned
in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Pearce v. lVistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah
1985). Witnesses qualified as exper ts may
testify if "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fa ct to und erstand the eviden ce or to determine a fact in issue. " Utah R.Evid. 702.
However , "[i]t is within the discretion of
the trial court to determine the suitability
of expert testimony in a case and the qualifications of the proposed expert." State v.
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982)
(decided un de r former rule) . Although
such testimony may be r elevant, it may be
excluded if the court determines "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of
t ime , or needless presentation of cumulati ve evidence. " Utah R.Evid. 403. The
probative value of evidence is determined
on the basis of ne ed and "its ability to
make the existence of a consequential fact
either more or less probable." State v.
Joh nson, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. 6, 8 (1989)
(quoting Sta te 1'. Will iams, 773 P.2d 1368,
1370 (Utah 1989)).

(3) We have examined the record and
can find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony of
two of plaintiff's seve n experts. It is quite
clear that the reason or reasons why Stephen Ostler's vehicle slammed into the rear
of Wheeler 's semitrailer could not be established. Plaintiff's case r ~lied significantly
on scientific evidence of th e "moth phenomenon," a theory that motoris ts are "lured"
at night to the lights of parked vehicles.
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and prejudicial; court had already ruled
that parking of truck was negligence as
matter of law, and jury was as capable as
expert in making determination of foreseeability. Rules of Evid., Rule 402.
6. Automobiles <3=243(3)
Question of how long truck had been
parked on shoulder of highway prior to
accident was properly excluded as irrelevant; evidence would ha\'e gone to issue of
truck driver's negligence, which issue had
already been resolved by directed verdict.
7. Appeal and Error <3=1060.](8), 1060.6
Negligence defendant's closing argument, reflecting fact that judgment could
be entered against defendants, but not indicating source of funds to pay such judgment, was not unfairly prejudicial; defendant did not improperly state that insurance would or would not pay judgment and
thus did not improperly elicit sympathy or
temper size of any award. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 41l.
8. Trial <3=133.6(4)
Any harm in negligence defendant's
clos ing argument's misstatement of law of
foreseeability was negated by court's admonishment to disregard statements of
counsel as to law, and look ' only to court's
instructions.
9. Trial <3=261
Court properly rejected negligence
plaintiff's suggested expansion of causation instruction; any expansion of given
instruction would likely have impaired,
rather than enhanced, jury's comprehension of issue .
10. Automob il es <3=245(50)
Issue of proximate cause in automobile
accident was for jury; evidence tended to
establish that proximate cause was not
only in substantial dispute but was very
essence of controversy between parties .

Robert J. DeBry, Daniel F. Bertch, Warren W. Driggs, and Dale F. Gardiner (argued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

.UES

M. Dayle Jeffs (argued) and Robert L.
Jeffs, Provo, for defendants, third-party
plaintiffs and respondents.
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, J udge:
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict
against him in a negligence action. We
affirm.
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father
Stephen home to Utah from a business trip
to California. At approximately 3:00 a.m.,
the Ostler's compact pickup was northbound on Interstate 15, a few miles south
of Payson, Utah. Stephen Ostler was driv ing . For unknown reasons, the pickup left
the lane of traffic and struck the rear of a
truck and semitrailer unit parked on the
paved shoulder of the roadway. Stephen
Ostler was killed instantly. Plaintiff, who
had been sleeping on the bed of the pickup,
was thrown onto the roadway and critically
injured.
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist
down as a result of his Injuries. He
brought a personal injury action in the
district court against the driver of the
semitrailer (defendant Stanley E. Wheeler),
the driver's employer (defendant Albina
Transfer Co., Inc.), and the semitrailer
owner (defendant F & R Roe, Inc.). During the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded
that Stephen Ostler was negligent and partially at fault for the accident. Earll' in the
trial, the court determined that Wheeler
was also negligent and directed a verdict of
negligence against him. The basis for this
ruling was that Wheeler had parked his
semitrail er on the shoulder of a controlled
access highway in violation of Ctah Code
Ann. § 41- 6-103(1)(i) (1988). The court resen'ed the issue of whether Wheeler's negligence was a "proximate cause" of the
accident. The jury eventually concluded
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was the
"intervening and sale proximate cause" of
plaintiff's injuries, and rendered a special
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litt le finger. The "ictim's rr ' -~e r als o tes ·
tified that the victim had be .. living with
her grandmother since the night of the
abuse because the victim was afraid of
staying in the trailer home where the abuse
had occurred. The presence of thi s evidence in the record, along with the remedial impact of the jury instruction , supports
continued confidence in the jury's verdict.
Th erefore, I believe that the admission of
the testimony was harmless, and I would
affirm defendant's convictions.
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Ralph OSTLER, Plaintiff and
Appellant,

v.
ALBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC.,
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R Roe,
Inc., Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs
and Respondents,

,',
Wanda OSTLER, Stephen K. Ostler, Gary
W. Ostler, Vyron R. Ostler, Dal e F, Ostler, Donnell B, Ostler, Sonda Mae
Ostler, Ralph O. Ostler, Brian L. Ostler,
Carlyle E. Ostler, Margaret Ostler, and
Natha n J. Ostler, as heirs of Stephen
Ostler, Gary Ostler, Dale Ostler, and
Eugene Ostler, d / b/a Go Cars, ThirdParty Defendants.
No. 880228-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 8, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 1989.

Injured automobile passenger brought
action against dri"er and owner of other
vehicle to recover for injuries . The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Cullen Y.
Christensen, J., entered judgment on jury
verdict for defendants, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals , Bench, J., held
that: (1) exclusion of certain expert testi-
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ma ny wa s not abu s e of('<cretion, an d (2)
defense coun sel 's closir.·u argument was
not unfairly prejudicial.
Affirmed.

1. Jury <'>131(8)

Voir dire in automobil e accident case
sufficiently addressed plaintiff's conc erns
of pot en tial bias ag ainst large monetary
awards where court, in lieu of plaintiff's
proposed questions, asked jurors if they
would object to awarding amount of damages being asked for and whether they
were capable of rendering fair and true
verdict based on evidence.

2. Evidence =99
Probative value of evidence is determined on basis of need and its ability to
make existence of consequential fact more
or less probable. Rules of E,·id., Rule 403.
3. Evidence =555.80)
Expert testimony regarding "moth
phenomenon," offered in injured passenger's suit to explain why driver veered off
highway and struck parked truck, was
properly excluded for lack of foundation;
there was no evidence that driver was
awake prior to night-time accident or that
parked truck had lights on which would

Hluref! driver.
4. Evidence =359(6)

Videotape of vehicle dri"ing off roadway at actual accident location, purporting
to show that no mishap would have occurred had truck not been parked on road
shoulder, was properly excluded from injured passenger's negligence suit; videotape differed from actual accident in that it
was produced during daylight conditions
and employed alert, professional stunt driver. Rules of Evid., Rules 401 , 403.
5. Appeal and Error =1056.](3)
Even if exclusion of federal motor
carrier regulati ons and road safety and design evidence was error , in injured passenger's action against owner of struck truck
which had been illegally parked on shoulder of highway , reversal was not required
absent showing that error was substantial
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS
CASE
._----IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
This
Jeff's case.
judge

s ho uld

is

not Robert

Nor is this
have

l o sing the case;

false

is this

Judge Bench's case.
pride

Dayle

No lawyer or

in winning the

case;

or in

the attorneys o n bot h sides, as well as

the entire panel of judges, have a j o int goal of seeking juslice .
This is Ralp h Ostler ' s

}

Nor

or in writing an opinion; or in changing an

Presumably,

opi nion.

•

a

DeBry's case.

his body

from

case.

the waist clown.

Ralph Os t ler lost half
He deserves

informed, reasoned analysis by each judge.
is no·t what he got.

a

t houghtful,

Unfo rtunat ely , that

What Ra l ph Ost l er got was a superficial

Opinio n that did not even touch on the core issues.
spend his lifetime in a whee l chai r.

Ra lph will

Surely his ca se merits a

few extra hou r s of time by the judges.
Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this

)

case ,

Ost.ler has employed an expert to determine whether the

dec is ion makiny

process

has

broken down

experts opinio n is attached as Exhibit A.
1

)

in

this

case.

The

Ostler's

expert

is

chairperson

of

Philosophy at the University of Utah.

the

Department

of

Plaintiff's expert has

rated the qual i ty of this Court ' s Opinion as a !2 or E grade.
This

is

not

intended

to

criticize

or

embarrass

the

Court.

Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing
a grave

injustice.

Hopefully the Court will

be inclined t o

thank counsel , rather than to retaliate.
POINT II
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECEN'l' PRECEDENT
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon."

The trial

court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a
foundation

could

be

prior to the accident.

laid

that

father

Ostler was

awake

(See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.)

just
This

court echoed the trial court's reasoning:
[T 1he theory was premised on the fact that a
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured"
. without this foundation, the Court determined that the expert testimony would not be
helpful t o the jury .
Slip Opinion, at p . 4.
However,
Huddleston v.

this

Court

United States,

overlooked

the

108 S . Ct.

1496;

(198 8 ):
2

recent
99

case

of

L . Ed 2d 771

'.

)

In determining whether the government has
introduced sufficient ev idence to meet Ru le
l04(b), the trial co urt neither weighs credibility nor ma kes a f inding that the government
has pro ved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court simpl y exa mines a l l the evidence and decides whether the
jury cou l d r easonab l y find the conditional
fact .
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Compare , Brief of Appellant at p . 6 & 7.)
In this
t he

jury cou l d

case ,

there was abu ndan t

have concluded

t ha t

evidence from which

father Ostler was

(See , Br ief of Appellant at p . 4 & 5.)

awake.

Contrary to Huddleston,

t he trial court did not permit the evidence of the p r el iminary
Nor did the trial court apply

fact issue to go to the jury.

(viz, whet her the j ury cou ld reason -

the Iluddleston analysis.
ab ly

find

from

the

evide nce

that

This is not a matter of discretion .

father

Ostler was

awake. )

Hu ddleston must be applied

to the facts of this case.
POINT III
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT FJ\ILED
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECEN'l' PRECEDENT FROM
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A second

maj or

issue

Wheeler h ad misstated the

i n the case was

that

defendant

law i n his closing argument.

generally , Brief of Appel l ant at p. 33.)

( See

This Court's Opinion

holds that any error was cured by the following comments of the
judge:
3

}

The jury is directed to look at the instructions.
They set forth the law in that regard.
Statement of counsel is to be disregarded
except as it is accurate.
Slip Opinion, at p. 8 .
However,
the

this Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on

issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure

the error.

Strangely, this Court's Opinion relies upon Halford

v.

558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App.

Yandell,

1977).

However, Halford,

squarely holds that such comments by the Court are not sufficient to cure the error.
More import an tly,

this Court's Opinion totally ignores

the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v.
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).
p.

35

&

36.)

Shickles,

760

(See discussion at Brief of Appellant at

A proper application of the Shickles case should

have led to a reversal .
POINT IV
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS
IN THE COUR']" S JURY INS'rRUCTIONS
Ostler challenged the Court's
dent

intervening

def ine

the

term

cause

on

four

intervening

ins truction on indepen-

grounds:

independent

first,
cause;

failure
second,

foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test)
mine

causation;

third,

that only a
4

generalized

to

that

to deter-

risk of

harm

need be

foreseeable;

and

fourth ,

confusion.

(See generally,

Br i ef of Appellant at p. 56-58.)
This Court's Opinion deals on ly with the fourth iss ue:
viz.

-,

Rehearing is

confusion.

necessary to analyze the other

three defects in the j ury instruction s . 1
Wit h respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that
the confu si on was no t
v.

" substantial or prejudicial".

Utah Transit Authority ,

preme Court

reversed,

671 P . 2d 217

in part ,

struction o n superceding ca us e.

In Harris

(Utah 1983),

the Su -

upon the confus ion of an in 1t

is obvious that the Utah

Supreme Court r egards confus i o n regarding s uperceding cause to
be serio us enough for reversal.
POIN'r V
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE nTIS COURT'S OPINION
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIAB I LITY
There were two theories of liability:
First,

that Wheeler was unlawfully parked on the side

of the road in violation of §41 -6-10 3(i)(i).
poi nted out ,

tha"t

As this Court has

theory was conceded by t he defense , and the

1 It is true that the Court did instruct the jury on
concurrent neglig e nce .
(Slip opi nion p. 9.)
However, concur rent negligence does no t .. f ill the gap . "
The instruction on
co ncurrent negligence does not inform the jury of the dividing
line between concurrent cause and intervening cause.

5

.'"

Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proximate cause) .
The

second theory of

liability was

that Wheeler was

parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes.
This theory was not conceded.
However,

this Court has failed to appreciate that the

chain of causation is different depending upon which theory of
liability applies.

Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 min-

utes must simply turn on blinking lights.

But a truck parked

for more than 10 minutes must additionally put out flares or
triangles.

(See

generally,

Brief

Ostler's expert exclaimed that

of

Appellant

at

p.

12. )

flares and triangles offer an

additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and
that the accident could have been avoided if this additional
warning had been in place.

(Transcript,

232-233,

284.)

In

short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proximate

cause.

This

Court's

Opinion

simply

overlooked

this

second theory of liability.
POINT VI
REHEAHING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED RES'l'ATEMEN'l' 442 AND 447
This Co urt gl o ssed over the claim for a directed v erdict by saying that it was a jury issue.
6

However, our Supreme

•

Court

has

adopted

Section

442

of

the

Restatement 2 .

Court also accepts Section 447 of the Restatement,
jury issue.
deed,
"

,

the

If

this

there is no

The result must follow as a matter of logic.
illustration

of

Section

447

of

the

Restatement

Inis

very similar to tllis case:
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall
from it.
He parks it in a street where to his
knowledge small boys congrega te for play.
B,
aile of the boys, tri.es to climb on the truck.
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he causes
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt C, a
comraue s tanding close by.
B' s act is not a
superseding cause of C's harm.
Reply Brief of Appellant at Appendix Two.
To dispose

of

Ostler's

motion

for

a

directed verdic t

without analyzing the interplay between. Sectiun 442 and 447 of
the Restatement is grossly superficial .
DATED this

:2./

day of

,iCf-rZ;2-r--k

,1989 .

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

(Utah

2 llarris

v.

Utah

Transit

Authority,
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217,

219
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IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals

refused to follow binding precedence of this courL
2.

Ce rti orari

is

proper

because

of

the

unusual

course of proceedings in the Cou rt of Appeals.
3.

Certiorari

is

proper

because

this

court

has

already granted certiorari on an identical issue.
4.

Certiorari

is

proper

because

the

Utah

Court of

Appeals refused to consider an alternate theory of liability.
5.

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals

refused to consider Ostler's expert testimony.
6.
did

not

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals
adequate

give

consideration

to

defects

in

jury

instructions.
V.

OFFICIAL REPORTS
This
(Utah 1989).

case

is

reported

at

117

Utah Adv.Rep.

P.2d

14

(See Appendix . )
VI.

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTI ON
The Court of Appeals Op inion was filed on September 8,
1989 .

On October 18, 1989, rehearing was denied.
On October 26,

1989, this court granted enlargement of

time for filing a petition for certiorar i
This court
Utah Code Ann.

§

to December 15,

1989 .

has power to grant certiorari pursuant to

78 - 2- 2 and Rules 42-48 of the Supreme Court.
1

.'

/

VII .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a collision between a vehicle and a
semi - truck

illegally

parked

on an

returned a verdict for defendant.
grounds .

interstate

highway.

A jury

Plaintiff appealed on various

The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Plaintiff

seeks

certiorari

and

asks

this

court

to

review legal issues which were presented to the Court of Appeals.
VIII.
FACTS
The basic facts of the case are as follows:
On the night of Apr i l 18, 1984 , plaintiff
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father
Stephen home to Utah from a business t rip to
California .
At approximately 3:00 a.m., the
Ostler's compact pickup was northbound on
Interstate 15 , a few miles south of Payson,
Utah.
Stephe n Ostler was driving.
For
unknown reasons, the p i ckup left the lane of
traffic and struck the rear of a truck and
semi trailer unit parked on the paved shoulder
of t he roadway .
Stephen Ostler was killed
instantly.
Plaintiff, who had been sleeping
in t he back of the pickup, was thrown onto
the roadway and critically injured.
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist down
as a result of his injuries .
He brought a
personal injury action in the district court
against
the driver of
the
semitrailer
(defendant Stanley E. Wheeler), the driver's
employer
(defendant Albina Transfer Co . ,
Inc . ), and the semitrailer owner (defendant F
& R Roe,
Inc . ) .
During the five - day tria l ,
plaintiff conceded that Stephen Ostler ( the
father), was negligellt and partially at fault
for the accident .
Early in the trial , the
court determined that Wheeler was also
negligent
and
directed
a
verdict
of
negligence against him.
The bas is for this
ruling was
that Wheeler had parked Ilis
2

I

I,
\..,~..

'-

semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled
access highway in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 41 - 6- 103(1)(i) (1988),
The c o urt reserved
the issue of whether Wheeler's negligence was
a " proximate cause" of the accident ,
The
jury eventually concluded that
Stephen
Ostler's negligence was the "intervening and
sole proximate cause"
of the plaintiff's
injuries , and rendered a special verdict for
defendants , 117 Utah Adv, Rep, at 14,
IX,
ARGUMENT

POINT I
CERTIORARI IS PRO PER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
REFUSED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENCE OF THIS COURT
It is clear that the rule of superceding causation set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Harris v,

adopted,
1983),

§

447

( 196 5) has been

Utah Transit Authority

671

P,2d 217

In Godesky v,

Provo City Corp "

690 P,2d 541,

(Utah

545 (Utah

1984) this court held :
An
intervening negligent
act does
not
automatically become a superceding cause that
relieves the original actor of liability ,
The earlier
actor is charged with the
foreseeable
negligent
acts
of
others ,
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is
foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a
concurring cause,
Ha rris
once

the

v,

Utah

negligence

established,

the

superceding

cause

unforeseeable,"
Restatement

Trans i t

of

one

ne gligence
unless
671

P,2d

position on

Authority,

stopping
of

a

it

is

at

220,

supra ,

(parking)

subsequent
"s o

holds

a

that

vehicle

is

driver

is

not

extraordinary

as

to

Ba rr is

superceding cause,

ha vi ng

adopted

further

states

a
be

the
that

the focus of the trial should be on a comparison of the relati ve
3

fault of the parties .

Id, at 222.

In t h is case, the principles set forth in § 447 of the
Restatement

were

not

followed

by

the

Court

of

Appeals

in

This is a clear departure by the Court

rendering its decision.

of Appeals from the standards set by this court in Harris, supra
and Godesky , supra .
Utah Code Ann.§ 41 - 6 - 103( 1 )(i) states :
No person shall : stop, stand or
park
a
vehicle.
.on
allY
controlled access highway.
Based upon
verdict
reserved

of

this

negligence

the

issue

of

statute,

against

the

trial

defendant.

proximate

cause

court directed

However,

which

the

a

Court

should

have

been

purpose

of

this

decided based upon Restatement § 447 .
Ostler
statute

was

offered

to

evidence

safeguard

distracted) drivers.

that

errant

the

(sleepy

or

sleeping

or

For example:

Parked tractor trailers on shoulders of our
high speed highways introduce unnecessary
obstacles in the clear recovery area.
(R.
1359.)

Ultimately , if the parked
been there,
an accident
occurred.
(R. 1368. )
Compare

Laird

v.

Travelers

vehicle had not
might not have
Insura nce

Co .,

267

So. 2d

714, 718 (La. 1972):
. [T]his statute [parking on the highway)
is designed to protect against the risk that
a driver, whether cautious or inat tenti ve,
would collide with a stationary vehicle .
Id.
In this case we have exactly the type of accident which
the

statute

sought to

avoid.

A truck parked in the emergency
4

lane.

An errant (sleepy or distracted)

driver drifted into the

emergency lane and hit the truck .
This

scenar i o

triggers

the

application

not

only

of

Section 447 of the Restatement , but also Sections 442A and 4428 1 .
The risk of an errant driver striking a truck parked on
the shoulder of the interste.te is
statute
442A,

was

intended

to

remedy.

a foreseeable risk which ·the
Under

Restatement

Sections

442B and 447, the occurrence of the very event the statute

was designed to prevent precludes a

finding that the negligence

of Father Ostler was an intervening cause.

The focus of Harris,

supra, is a comparison of the relative fault of the two negligent
parties under the comparative negligence statute instead of

(as

allowed by the trial court in this case) a defe nse based upon the
fact that the negligent truck driver did not foresee the specific
negligence of Father Ostler.

Harris, supra, at 222.

The defense

at trial effectively overruled the principles of the Restatement
Sections (442A , 442B & 447) as well as the principles set out by
this court in Harris and Godesky,
the

opinion of

the

Court

of

supra .

Appeals

in

If allowed to stand ,
this

case

effectively

overrules the principles of Restatement Sections 442A, 4428, and
447

and is

a distinct departure from the principles set out in

Harris and Godesky.
As a matter of law,

it was not .. highly extraordinary"

to suspect that an errant driver might drift onto the emergency
IGiven the adoption by this court of Sect.ion 447 o f lhe
Restatement (Second) of To rts (1965), this court should also
specifically adopt and follow Sections 442A and 4428.
5

lane.

Indeed,

the

statute

assumes

that

errant

drivers

will

stray . c.f. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., sup ra .
Ostler's
among

truck

expert

drivers

emergency lane.

that

testified
errant

it

was

drivers

common

often

knowledge

stray onto

the

(Tr. 286, 864 - 865.)

Plaintiff asked the trial court to direct a verdict on
the issue of superceding and proximate cause.
refused.

Having so refused,

The trial court

plaintiff should have been allowed

an instruction on the applicable law under Restatement
of To rts

§

442A,

between

the

Restatement

442B & 447 .

Illustration
§

to

(See Point IV.)
the

comment

(Second)

The similarities

on

clause

(a)

in

447 and the present case is striking.

The said comment reads:
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall
from it. He parks it in a street where to his
knowledge small boys congregate for play . B,
one of the bOYS, tries to climb on the truck.
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he
causes a heavy article to fall upon and hurt
C, a comrade standing close by .
B' s act is
not a superseding cause of C's harm.
A similar comparison could be made to Comment

(b)

to

Section 442A and to Illustration 2 thereunder .
If under either Section 442A,
verdict

was

not

instructed the

proper,

trial

court

should

a directed
then

have

jury with respect to the Restatement principles

found in Sections 442A,
Appeals

the

442B or 447

ignored

this

442B & 447.
issue

and

instructions adequate.
6

See Point V.
held

the

The Court of
trial

court's

It

would

appear

proper

for

this

court

to

grant

certiorari for the purpose of resolving the following:
a)

Why the Court of Appeals ignored the provisions of
Restatement

442A,

§

442B

447

&

as

well

as

the

precedents set in Godesky, supra; and Harris.
b)

vlhether
direct
cause

it
a

is

appropriate

verdict

and/or

on

for

the

proximate

a

trial

issues
cause

of
in

court

to

superceding
cases

where

negligence resulting from violation of a statute
is admitted and the asserted superceding cause is
an

act

clearly

intended

to

be

protected by

the

statute.
c)

What type of

jury instruction should be given to

allow the issues raised by Sections 442A , 442B and
447 of the Restatement to be properly presented to
the jury?
The
development

trial
of

should

court

plaintiff's

proximate cause,

i.e.

that

second
the

also

have

theory

failure

of

of
the

allowed
negligence

full
and

truck driver to

place warning devices was negligence and a proximate cause of the
injury.

Failure to allow this alternative theory to be developed

was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals, but was not
adequately covered in the Opinion.
This
court

held

theories

to

clearly appears

that
tile

a

See, Point IV, infra .

to depart

from Harris where the

plaintiff is entitled to present all of
jury.

It

is
7

reversible

error

to

his

preclude

presentment of a valid theory of recovery.

671 P . 2d at 222.

In closing argument , defendant's counsel misstated the
law to the jury2.

Plaintiff objected.

sustain or overrule the objection.

The trial court did not

The trial court stated : "the

jury is directed to look at the instructions.
law in that regard.

Statement of counsel is to be disregarded
117 Utah Adv. Rep . at 17.

except as it is accurate."
is

whether

the

They set forti, the

instruction

of

prejudice of the misstatement.

the

trial

court

The issue

remove d

the

The Court of Appeals stated:

Even if counsel's remarks misstated the law,
any prejudicial impact appears to be negated
by the courts admonishment. 117 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 17. (Emphasis added.)
The

holding

ignores

Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,
In Shickles ,

this

court's

ruling

in State v .

(Utah 1988) .
this court held that if the trial court

failed to act to dispel erroneous statements of counsel by (1)
rul ing on the objection 'vhen made,
with

positive

required.

to

the

this

and

(2)

case

the

told the

co urt

to

be

misstatement,

reversal

is

erro r.

117

(1)

did

not

rule

on

the

jury to refer to the ins tructions.

Notwithstanding, Shickles, supra,
not

instructing the jury

760 P . 2d at 299 - 300.
In

obj ection,

correction

and (2)

the Court of Appeals held this

Utah Adv.

Rep.

at

17.

Certiorar i

is

certainly appropriate to correct such a misapprehension.

2It is reversible error for counsel to misstate the law in
Jensen v. Utah Railway, 72 Utah 366 , 370 P.2d
closing argument.
358 (1927) .
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POINT II
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL COURSE
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Rule

43(3)

of

states that certiorar i
has " .

affidavit

of

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

is appropriate where the Court of Appeals

of

by Ms.

Patricia

is

Ostler ' s

This case involves such a departure.

A part

University

the

Chairperson
of

for

In substance,

op inion

of

the

record

of

Hannah,
of

This

Utah.

Petition

Appeals 3 .
the

Rules

.depa rt ed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings."

Hannah

the

the

the

Court

Ph. D.

of

was

Reconsideration

in

the affidavit is a

Court of Appeals .

is

an

(See Appendix.)

Department

affidavit

Appeals

filed
the

of

Philosophy,

in

support

of

Court

of

Utah

21 page analysis of

The affidavit

states

in

part :
I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.
However, I am trained in logic and argumentation.
Indeed, the field of philosophy is
in large measure devoted to the study of
arguments
and
the
process
of
analytic
reasoning.
I
have
taught
classes
in
deductive and inductive logic, as well as in
3 Basic
considerations
of
due
process
demand
that
a
litigant be given an opportunity to be heard on all pertinent
issues raised by his case at both the trial and appellate level.
In every instance the litigant is entitled by due process to have
the court consider and deal with all issues fairly raised.
It is
clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opinion.
Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the trial
advocate .
Nor was that step taken lightly.
However, it i s a
serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a passing grade
on a college level .
Hopefully, the Court will not criticize
counsel for this unusual step.
Hopefully, the court will valu e
this input, as it undertakes the serious task of supervising the
irlferior courts of this state.

9

(
epistemology
(theory
scientific inquiry.

of
knowledge)
and
.(p.2 paragraph 3.)

I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read
the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in
Ost ler v. Albina, et al.
I have been asked
to render an opinion of that Opinion.
Since
I am not an attorney, I have not been asked
to determine if the Opinion is right or
wrong.
Ra ther,
I
have been asked to
determine the extent to which the Opini.on
fairly analyzes issues raised in the briefs.
(p.2, paragraph 4.)
I have read the briefs of both parties, the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, and I have
had trial transcripts available for crosschecking .
(p .2, paragraph 5.)
In my opinion,
this Opinion reflects
a
breakdown in the decision making process.
If
this Opinion had been written by one of my
undergraduate students as an exercise in a
course, I would have gi.ven it a grade of "D";
from a graduate student,
it would have
counted as failing work.
(p . 2, paragraph 6.)
I can only conclude that in reading its
decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take
into account many important aspects of the
arguments made in the appeal.
(p.20 . )
In

summary,

there

is

a

good

faith

basis

to

believe

that there has been a breakdown in the decision making process
at

the

Court of Appeals.

treatment

of

superficial .

many

issues

Certiorari

At

a minimum,

raised
should

in
be

the

the

Court of Appeals

briefs

granted

to

was

grossly

correc t

such

superficial work of an inferior court and to allow the serious
issues presented in this appeal to receive the type of judicial
review to which they are entitled to provide due process of low
to plaintiff herein.
fair

and

adequate

Basic due process considerations mandate a
consideration

10

and

resolution

of

the

issues

(

presented

to

an appeals

court.

A real question exists

in the

present case as to whether such was done in the present case.
POINT III
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT
HAS ALREADY GRANTED CERTIORARI ON AN IDENTICAL
ISSUE IN ANOTHER PENDING CASE
In
recent
scare

the

trial

court,

Ostler

advertising campaign by
the

capstone
Insurance

public

to

about

this

The

Group .

evidence

insurance companies

jury

advertising

submitted

awards.

(R.

program was

letter

was

sent

a

to

of

designed

1255-1273.)
letter
all

a
to

The

by Farmers

policy

holders

shortly prior to this trial.

The letter states in part:

pay for plaintiff's lawyers."

(See Appendix.)

"You

Ostler submitted various voir dire questions inquiring
about jury attitudes regarding this "tort reform" publicity.
particular,

Ostler

asked which

of

the

prospective

jurors

In
were

covered by Farmers Insurance 3 .
The trial court refused to give Ostler's requested voir
dire questions.

The Court

0

f Appeal s

a f firmed.

In so dOing,

the Court of Appeals relied on its reasoning in Doe v . Hafen, 772
P.2d 455 (Utah App. 19 89) the court stated:
I n their total i ty, and in context with the
remainder of voir dire, their questions are
substantially responsive
to plaintiff's
concerns and appear sufficient to revea l
"to rt reform" bias in the manner discussed in
Doe.
117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.
3 Eac l 1 jl,ror cove red by Farmers would have received Exhibit
B shortly before the trial.
Farmers was also the insurance
carrier defending the case on behalf of defendant.
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However,

this court has recently granted certiorari in

Doe v.

Hafen.

Doe v.

Hafen involve identical threshold issues

dire)

and

(See Exhibit C, Appendix . )

since

this

court

has

already

Since this case and
(viz.

granted

jury voir

certiorari

to

review Doe v. Hafen, it would be a matter of judicial economy for
this

court

unjust

for

to

consider

Ostler

to

both
lose

together 4 .

cases
his

case

in

part

It

would

based

upon

seem
the

reliance by the Court of Appeals on the case of Doe v. Hafen if
Doe were to be subsequently overturned by this Court.
POINT IV
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REFUSED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF LIABILITY
There
defendant

had

were

two

theories

of

liability.

First,

illegally parked in the emergency lane ;

negligent parking was a proximate cause of the accident.
issue,

the

trial

court

directed

a

verdict

on

the

and such
On this

negligence,

but

reserved the issue of proximate cause.
The second theory of liability was that defendant had a
( federal)

duty

to

set

out

f lares

or

triangles 5;

and

tha t

the

failure to put out such warning devices was a proximate cause of
the accident.

The court did not direct a verdict on this issue.

In three separate portions of the opinion, the Court of
4 See ,
Robert L . Stern,
Eugene Gressman
Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, p . 221 (1986) .

and

Steven

H.

5Fe deral regulations require truckers to put out flares or
triangles, "as soon as possible, but in any event within 10
minutes.
49 C.F.R . § 322.
12

•

Appeals addressed the issue of negligence for failure to put out
flares

and triangles.

On each occasion ,

the Court of Appeals

refused to even consider the issue.
We last address plainti ff' s claim of error
regarding
the exclusion of
evidence on
federal motor carrier regulations.
[This)
evidence
goes
to
the
issue of
Wlleeler's negligence,
a matter previously
decided by directed verdict,
and may be
excluded as irrelevant . 117 Utah Adv . Rep. at
16.

* * *
Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to
permit him to s how that Wheeler had been
parked on the shoulder of the highway for as
long as 30 minutes unduly restricted crossexamination.
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument
when the alternate basis for the court's
ruling
is
considered,
namely that the
questions of how long Wheeler had been parked
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's
negligence .
Since that issue has
been
resol ved by directed verdict.
The excluded
testimony was irrelevant . Id.

* * *
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury
instructions. The first instruction involves
the placement of emergency warni.ng devices
behind Wheeler's parked truck . We agree that
the given instructi o n s igni f icantly di f fers
from
plaintiff's
requested
instruction .
However, the instruction concerned the issue
of Wheeler's negligence .
We have already
established that this issue had been ta ke n
from the jury.
Any error could not have
affected the substantial rights of plaintiff
and was therefore, harmles s .
117 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 17.
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reasoning.
The chain of causation f o r

negligent parking
13

is different

from

the chain of causation

for

failure

to put

out warning flares .

If the defendant did not cause the accident by parking illegally;
he

may

well

have

caused
If

emergency flares.

the

accident

by

Stephen Ostler was

failing
awake ,

to

the

awakening

out

f lares or

triangles may have guided him around the danger area.
was asleep,

put

If Ostler

driving over the triangles would have caused a noise
the

driver.

(Tr.

232 - 34,

A

284 . )

completely

independent act of negligence was kept from the jury by the trial
court's rulings and the Court of Appeals glossed over this issue
without even a discussion of its merits.
The Court of Appeals held that negligence for failure
to

place

negligent
otherwise .

flares
for

was

irrelevant

illegal

The

jury

because
The

parking.
could

find

no

defendant
jury

was

could

proximate

already
conclude

cause

for

the

illegal parking; but that, there was proximate cause for failing
to put out flares .

The opinion of the Court of Appeals ignores

this

Clearly,

possibility.

a

refusal

recovery be presented to a jury is error.
Authority, supra.

to

allow

a

theory

of

Harris v. Utah Transit

The Court of Appeals ignored the precedent of

Harris and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

POINT V
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE TIlE COURT OF APPEALS
REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY
BY OSTLER'S EXPERT TESTIMONY
Stephen
dr iving lanes,

Ostler

(plaintiff's

father)

drifted

and crashed into the rear of defendants'
14

off

the

parked

A ce ntral issue is why .

truck.

Plaintiff's

asleep .
"lured"

off

scientific

the

road

phenomenon

The
"moth

expert

trial

effect" .

by
is

court

The

Court

the

The defense argued t ha t he was

proffered

testimony

illegally

sometimes

refused

parked

referred

to

receive

of Appeals

to

that

he

truck .
as

t he

evidence

affirmed.

was

The

This
"moth

of

the

Court

of

Appeals stated:
Even if such a theory is admissible under the
threshold requirement of inherent reliability
[c i ta tion omitted 1 .
The theory is premised
on the fact that a driver must be awake to be
lured.
117 Utah Adv . Rep. at p. 15 .
Thu s,

a

foundation

issue

\-las

\-lhether

Stephen Ostler

(father) \-las a\-lake or had his eyes open 7 so he could be lured 8 .
On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104 (b) of the Utah Rules of
6 For example , California Highway Patrol cars are struck
approximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing
lights.
Upon the advise of Ost le r's expert , the CalifoJ:nia
Highway Patrol has done a\-lay ''lith off and on flashers .
(Tr .
231 . )
Indeed , the Federal Department of Transportation has
recently recognized the
"moth effect"
as an industry wide
problem .
(Tr . 284 . )
7 De fendants offered a series of night - time photos of the
parked truck.
The foundation for the night - time photos was that
Ostle r's eyes were open .
Ostler thereupon proffered evidence on
the "moth ef feet" as rebuttal testimony .
Thus, the foundation
for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect theol:y was
identical, viz . that Ostler's eyes were open .
The Court of
Appeals , likewise, ignored this crucial issue .
(See Exhibit F.)
80stler's
experts
gave
five
reasons
to conclude that
Stephen Ostler \-las awake (so that he could be lured) .
The
reasons are summarized at Exhibit G .
The trial court rejected
all of this proffered testimony.

15

Evidence 9 and Huddleston v. United States ,

U.S.

108

S.CT. 1496, 99 L.ed. 2d 771 (1988) .
In Huddleston,

the Supreme Court of the United States

has recently stated:
In determining whether the government has
introduced suf fie ient evidence to meet Rule
104(b),
the
trial court neither weighs
credibility nor makes a finding that tIle
government has pro ved the conditional fact by
a preponderance of the evidence .
The court
simply examines all the evidence in the case
and decides whether the jury could reasonably
find the conditional fact .
.by a prepon derance of the evidence.
99 L.ed. 2d at 78283.

Clearly
whether

Father

evidence
proof

of

the

jury should

Ostler

the

was

expert

been

awake

or

asleep .

witnesses

on

the

Father Ostler was

104(b)

have

awake

begs

the

allowed
To

ground

to

decide

exc 1 ude
there

question.

the

was

Under

no

Rule

the evidence should have been admitted and then the jury

instructed they could consider it only if they believed Father
Ostle r was awake.
Assuming,

arguendo,

that the moth effects exists,

and

it being at issue whether Father Ostler was awake , it is proper
for

the

jury to consider moth effect as an explanation for the
IIarris v.

collision .
language

of

Huddleston,

Rule

Utah Transit Authority,

104(b)

and

the

Supreme

supra.
Courts

Given the
holding

in

the treatment of this issue by the Court of Appeals

9 "When t.he
relevancy of
evidence depe nd s
upon
ti,e
ful fillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon , or subject to , the introduction of evidence sufficient to
s upport a finding of the fulfillment of the condition ."
16

in

this

case

is

superficial.

No

attempt was

made

to discuss

Huddleston or Harris and no reasoned explanation was given as to
why the evidence should not have been allowed.

POINT VI
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
DID NOT GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO DEFECTS
IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The core issue in this case is vihether the trucker's
negligence

was

a

proximate

Stephen Ostler' s 10

negligence

cause
the

of

the

sole

accident .

Or

proximate cause

r

\-las

of

the

accident.
The law on this issue was purportedly presented by the
trial court's Instruction No. 27 .

(See Appendix.)

In the trial court, Ostler challenged Instruction No .
27 on four grounds :
a)

fai.lure of the jury instruction to define the term
independent intervening cause;

b)

foreseeabil i ty

is

only

one

test

(not

the

sole

test) to determine causation;

c)

only

a

generalized

risk

of

harm

need

be

foreseeable;
d)

confusion.

The Court of Appeals only dealt with confusion.
other

three

issues

are

serious

matters

supported

by

The

abundant

10Stephen Ostler was the father of plaintiff Ralph Ostler .
Stephen Ostler was driving . Ralph Ostler was asleep.
17

(

authorityll.
judicial

The

Court

standards

by

of

Appeals

refusing

to

departed

even

from

consider

acceptable

these

crucial

issues.
X.
SUMMARY OF ARGUHENT

Stephen
He

Hission.
California.

Ostler

was

was

returning

preparing
with

his

to

go

father

on

from

an
a

L.D.S .

visit

in

Father Ostle r was driving and Stephen was sleeping.

The Ostler car hit an illegally parked truck.
killed

immediately.

Stephen

Ostler

action)

was paralyzed from the waist down .

Father Ostler was

(the

plaintiff

in

this

This case does not

include any claims by Father Ostler.
During

a

jury

trial,

plaintiff

admitted

that

Father

Ost l er was negl i ge nt and partly at fault in causing the accident
(fo~

drifting

illegally
cause.

onto

parked).

the

emergency

The

central

lane

issue

where
at

the

trial

truck

was

was

proximate

Was the trucker's negligence in parking illegally in the

emergency

lane

or

in

fail in g

to

put

out

warning

devices

required by Federal law a proximate cause of the accident.

as
The

trial court refused to allow plaintiff to develop his alternate
theory

of

liability

based

upon

failure

to

put

out

warning

devices.

lIThe sole issue treated by the Court of Appeals was
confusion.
This completely ignores Restatement § 442A and 4428,
the other elements of Section 447 and the court's holdings in
Harris and Godes),¥., supra.
The Court of Appeals concluded the
instruction was not confusing .
However,
it was absurd to
conclude that Instruction No . 27 was understandable to a lay
person , and it certainly misstated the l aw.
18

The

jury returned a verdict for defendant.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed .
The

head

of

th e

Department

of

Philosophy

at

the

Unive r sity of Utah ( Dr. Pat rici a Hannah) made a 21 page analysis
of

the Op i nion of

the Court of Appeals.

Hannah testified that
no t

conunent

Hannah

on

the

testified

she was not a

correctness

that

she

of

has

(See Appendix.)

lawyer;
the

and thus she could

opinion .

considerable

teaches logic and argumentation .

I1s.

However ,

expertise

grade for the analysis.

115 .

in

and

Hannah summarized that if

the opinion were writ ten by an undergraduate s ludent,
give a "D"

Hs.

she would

A graduate student would get

a failing grade .
Among

other

things,

the

Opinion

of

the

Court

of

Appeals :
a)

Ignores

the position of the Restatement

(Second)

of Torts on independent intervening c ause.
b)

Almost

totally

whether

the

ignores

jury

was

the

central

properly

issue

of

instructed

on

independent intervening cause.
c)

Ignores

the

precedent

Utah

from

the

Rules

0

United

f

Evidence
States

and

Supreme

recent
Court

with respect to foundation of expert testimony .
d)

Failed to follow binding precedent o f this court
on the sufficiency of curative instructions and to
apply Restatement (Second) of Torts

e)

§

447.

Ignored an a lternative theory of liability.
19

(

,

l · ,

Rule

43 (3)

of

the

Rules

of

states that certiorari may be proper
. has departed

the

Utah

where

Supreme

Court

the lower court,

from the accepted and usual course of

judicial

proceedings. "
Ralph
He

lifetime.

Ostler
will

will

be

ponder

for

tied
his

to

his

lifetime

wheelchair
why

the

Court

Appeals did not even consider his arguments o n appeal.
wonder
head of

for

his

lifetime

whether

he

go t

true

justice

for

a
of

He will
when

the

the Department of Phil o sophy gave the Opinion a failing

grade.
Certiorari should be granted where the Court of Appeals
ill

rendering

its

opinion

in

this

case

has

failed

to

follow

established precedent and has made such a radical departure from
the traditional high standards of the Bench in Utah.
DATED this

ly-0- day

of

O-€./'~~

, 1989.

ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

By

0566-128 \ jn
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
the

hereby certify that

four true and correct copies of

foregoing PETITI ON FOR i'lRIT OF CERTIORARI

(Ostler v,

et al , ) w~s mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this
1

/)

,{;.i/0.--n~

,1989, to the f ollowing :

,

M. Dayle Jeffs
,TEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo , UT
84603
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Albina,

. --rt,

/S

""'-day of

I
"

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
Edward
Ostler ,

certifies

Certiorari

is

that

filed

delay.

T.

in

Wells,
the

foregoing

good

faith,

__-rt,

DATED this

attorney

!) -- day

of

f or

appellant

Petition

and

not

for

f or

Ralph

Writ

of

purposes

of

--",,~::...
,-,-,=,,=~~=~=
,. -=-_ '

1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Att o rneys f o r Plaintiff

,/)

~~~/

4

'-:;- j

v/

BY/~f{ We, /7~_
EDWARD T , WELLS

22

'

APPENDIX 4

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF

)

PATRICIA HANNA

)

vs.

)
ALBINA TRANSFER CO ., INC.

)

OF & R ROE, INC., and

)

STAN LEY E. WHEELER,

)

Case No.

88 -00228-CA

)
____~D~e~f~e~n~d~a~n~ts~.______________ )
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

My name is Patricia Hanna.

ss.

I give the following testimony under

oath:
1.

hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati.

2.

am chairp erson of the Department of Philosophy at the

University of Utah .
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I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.

In logic and argumenta tion.

However, I am trained

Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large

measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of ana lytic
rea so ning.

I have taught classe s in deductive and in ductive logic, as well

as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry.

My

curricu lum vita is attach ed .
4.

I have been asked by Robert J. OeBry to read the Opinion of the

Utah Court of Appeals in

Ostler v. Albina et al.

render an opinion of that Opinion.

I have been asked to

Since I am not an attorney, I have not

been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong.

Rather, I have

been asked to dete rmine the extent to wh ich the Opinion fai rly analyzes
issues raised in the briefs.
5. I have read the brie fs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts availab le for cross-checking .
6.

In my op inion, thi s Opinion reflects a breakdown in th e decision

making process .

If this Opinion had been written by one of my

undergraduate stude nts as an exercise in a course" I would have given it a
grade of '0;'

from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing

work.
7.

In my op inion , it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could

have been endorsed by three judg es.

Due to time pressures or

misunderstandings /- a single in dividual might fa il to g rasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's argum ents ; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three ind ividuals could all have made the same errors
in analys is.

I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a

sing le judge (Bench) , and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful a nd detailed reading and analys is wh ich they
deserved and required.
8.

My detai led analys is of the Court's Opinio n follows:

Page 3
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General Structure of Appeal
There is an underlying argument

In

the appeal which ties together 9

of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III ,
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated.

In

addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the
above mentioned 9 points.'

Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the

unifying argument, it is in my judgment impos sible to appreciate its full
fo rce.
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this.
The case of Ralph Ostler
(hereafter, Wheeler)et

(hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler

at. cannot be resolved without a decision on the

issues of prox imate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and
division of liability.

In order forlJbe jury to reach a reasoned conclusion

on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or
scientifically or factually based theor ies, and to be given a clear
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such
access, either the Jury cou ld not fulfill its respons ibility or it should have
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only
to determine the extent of Wheeler'S liability.
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur.

First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated

nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the
plaintiff's case.

Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no

appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a
bearing on more than one aspect of the case.
case of negligence and proximate cause.

This is most evident in the

While it might be understandable

, The Appellate Court makes no ruling on thi s aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no
argume nt ation supporting its de facto denial of tile appeal. This seems a significant omission
given IIlat the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the
Reply Br ief on pp. 45-48.
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that the tri al judg e , under the va riou s tim e constraints and pre ssures
im pose d by an on-go ing trial , might fail to appreciate thi s point, one
would suppo se th at th e appeals proc ess is in part intended to correct for
thi s by all ow ing three judges wh o have more tim e and distance to reflect
on the matter.

Thi s does not seem to have been the case; consequently,

I

can only conclude that the d ecision making process suffered a se rio us
b reakdo wn in the pres ent case.
In what follows, I sha ll ind icate how this argument is made and
sustaine d throu ghou t the docum entation presented to the Court of Appea l
on Ralph Ostler's be ha lf, and indicate how and wher e the Court of Appeal >
decis ion to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the
points rais ed by O stler's counsel.

I shall comment o nly on the 9 po ints

involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on thes e points.
Ass umot ions
There is no d ispu te on the following:

Whee ler negligently parked h

se mi-truck in th e emergency lane on 1- 1'5 between Santaquin and Payson .
Utah.

He failed to set out flashe rs or tr iangles mark ing the pre sence of

hi s truck , a nd at @ 2:00 a.m. (P .S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter fath er
Ostler) pi c k-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intr
the back of Wheeler's truck.

Throughout, I w ill take the se as. given.

Point
Th is contains the clearest statement of the general argument of II'
appeal , an d sets th e stage for wh at follow s .

It is argued that although

c.

major portion of th e trial revo lv ed aro und the issue of p ro xima te cause ,
alm os t all of the evidence pro ffe red by
court.

Ostler was rejecte d by the tri al

As a res ult, when the tr ial co urt r efus ed to direct a verdict agai r

Wheeler on the iss ue of ca usation, on the grounds th at it is a matter of
fact which should p rope rl y be determined by the jury (Point XI), the Jury
had see n no ne of the ev id ence which Ostler considered relevant thi s
decisio n .
In th e absence of clear proof that this evide nce lacke d all merit,
th is creates a se rio us problem for both p rocedura l and substantive

Affidav it of Patrici a Hanna
fa irn ess .
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In rejecting Ostle r' s evidence, the trial co urt give s either no

indication that the reason for denying th e jury access to the evidence w as
that the evidence was entirely without merit. 2 Instead , the evidence is
rej ec ted on at least one of three grounds:

1. because it was held to be

irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that
it would confuse the ju rors, and 3.

because it was felt that the jurors

already were fully awa re of th e phenomen a .

Th e appeal argues that th ese

grounds are all inadequate. 3
1.

The "moth-phenomenon " Whe el er'S failure to usp, emergencv devices,

and denial of presentation of 're-create d' accident without trllck in
emergency lane
Th e evide nce related to the moth phenomenon cons ists in a theory,
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail -light s, whether
fl ash ing or not , have a te ndency to "lure" sleepy drivers toward s them,
much as a moth is drawn to a light.

Thu s, if father Ostler was awake at

the time of the accident, Wheeler'S tail- lights might have exerted this
"lu rin g " effect on him, causi ng him to drive into the back of Wheeler' s
truck.
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triang les, Ostler
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testim o ny that had such
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided.
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the acc ident at the exact
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck
had not been present in the eme rgency lane, it was most likely that the
Ostler pick-up would have roll ed unharmed into a field.

2 At o ne point cou nse t tor the de tense raises a qu es tio n abo ut the qualitica tio ns ot Mr. Hulbert to
testify on th e matter o t th e so-ca ll ed "mo th-ph e nome non;" however , it is clea r trom the
transcript ot the tri al that any alleged lack ot expe rti se had nothing to do with the trial judg e's
decision to reject the evide nce (Transcript ot Trial, p. 245).
3 I have regrouped the sub-points under I acco rding to th eir log ica l connection s_
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In all Ihree cases the evidence wa s rejected on the grounds that it
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fath e.
Ostler was awake or asleep .

Taking each point in iso lation, might give

this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolat ion overl ook
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will bf
explained below, and th at Ostler also proposed introducing ev idence to
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time
of the accident.
2.

Was father Ostler awake?
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern

whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the approp riateness of th e
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place eme rgency devices and the
pertin ence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonabl e
to allow th e jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter.
However, the trial court rul ed that becaus e the evidence was not de cisiv
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate.
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and inte rpretation s of it to support hi s
claim that this rul in g was based on a misinterpretation of the law.
legal layma n, it seems to me that the case is this:

As a

Rule 104(b) says tha .

if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie su pport to a judgment
that someth ing is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jUfl
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision.

In the case at hand, th (

trial court denied the jury access to the evid ence on the grounds that thE.
evidence was not conc lu sive .

It strikes me that if indeed thi s were the

standard, there would be precious little for a jury eve r to deliberate; all
the evidence tlley would eve r be given would be such that "no reasonable
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear
would be directed verdicts .
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having app reci ated the logic '
Ostler's point here in denying the appea l.

In its decision the Court of

Appeals gives little atte ntion to thi s part of the appeal.

What atte nti on

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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does give fa lls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, say in g
only that "Pl aintiff' s own expert admitted that there was no conclusive
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
accident" (Opin ion, p. 4).

In light of Ostler's point, this statement is

sim ply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context.
3, Wheeler's violation of the 10-

15- and 70- hour rules

Ostler attempted to introduce evidence show ing that Wheeler was in
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane.
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold.

The

One, it contributes to his

negligence; the decision to rule it out because neg ligence was not
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable.
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability.
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would
affect whether and to what extent he should be held li able.

Further, if

Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an
attempt to stay awake , this would have a bearing on his culpability.

The

Court of Appeals comments only that th is (like all the other issues) "goes
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant.

~

Utah R. Evid . 402

("evidence which is not relevant is not admiss ible. ")" (Opinion, p. 6).
4.

The ourpose of the emergency lane

foreseeability of oossibility of

such an incident in designing highways and Wheeler's foreseen such a
possib il ity
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues
to show that, as an interstatp truck drive r Wheeler was 1) aware of the
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless
there was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within,
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would

Affidavit of Patriciz
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occasionally leave the road surface and st ray into the emergency lane),
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen.
Insofar as foreseeability is rel eva nt to proximate cause, this
evidence clear ly is related to that iss ue.

It was disallowed on the grour

that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were
"common knowledge."

The Cou rt of Appea ls upheld th e trial court' s rul in

T hi s is a mistake on two g rounds, 1) because it fai ls to take account of
the fact that one circumstance may relate to mo re than one iss ue,in thi,
case the circumstances are relevant !2Q1b. to negligence arui to proximat!
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common
knowledge.
Admissibility of th is evidence
Os tl er argues that all this evidence was relevant to th e case and
should have been admitted .

In order to see that th is is so, on e need s to

understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of App ea ls in
orde r to support his contenti o n that Wheeler was neglig ent, one of the
proximate causes of hi s inju ry and, therefore, liable .
Th is type of argum ent is ca ll ed a constr uctiv e d il em ma; it

IS

a w'

understood and valid form of argument 4
1.

Eithe r father Ostler was a wake or asleep at the time of the

accident.
2.

If he wa s awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a lu ring effect or

him, causing him to vee r off th e road; in the absence o f flashers o r
tr iangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the

proximate causes of th e

acciden t (fathe r Ostler's driv in g itse lf be ing the other), and Whe eler

IS

therefore liab le for the accident.

4 According 10 Wi ll iam Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Developmenl of Loaic (London: 196~
di temma has been recognized as a valid mode of arg umentation since the second cent ury A.D ..
when il appears in th e writing s o f Hermogenes (p . 178).

•
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3. tf, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, th en while there
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane
without flashers o r triangles st ill remains as one of the proximate causes
of the accident.
accident.
4.

Had the truck not been there, there would have been no

Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes.
Th e refore, regardle ss of whether fat he r Ostler was awake o r

asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the eme rg ency lane stands as a
proximate cause of the accident, and consequen tly Wheeler is at least
partially liable for the accidentS
To argue that taken piece-by -piece the evidence would not be helpful
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it
prevented Ostler's constructing this argument; furthe r,to argue that each
piece of evide nce is disallowed because it relates to negligence and
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of
eve nts.
our lives.

Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of
For· example, the fact that th e sky is blue is surely rel evant

(pertains) to th e artist trying to paint a land scape, but this does not make
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explai n the nature of our
atmosphere and light's reaction to it.

So too, the fact that all the

evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto

render it

ineligible for considerat ion by the jury in connection with the issue of
proximate cause.

This is especially so given the fact that the issue of

proximate cause was the key to the decision.

The Court of Appeals'

decision shows absolutely no appreciation of thi s fact, and In no sense
addresses it.

Inde ed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion

clearly demonstrates thi s.

5 A similar argument can be conslructed to show th at whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had th e emergency
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running ove r the triangl es would most
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; Ilad he not been asleep, the devices would
hav e alerted him to th e truck and allowed Ilim to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the
accident would have b een avoidable; tllerefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at th e
time of th e accident, the truck without emerge ncy devices in place, is one of the proximate
causes of tile acciden t.

Affidavit of Patric ia

'tnna

Page 10

Furthe r, in seve ral in stances the e vidence wa s rul ed out on th e
grounds that th e jury a lready knew eve rything being di sc ussed: afterall,
they had driven of interstate highways , driven at night, etc. Ostler
presents strong evidence that under one , an d perhaps th e most relevant,
s tandard of adm iss ibili ty of expert testimony, the tria l judge mi sapp li ec
th e law and held Ostler' s witn esses to too high a standard.

The Court of

Appeals s imply endorses th e trial court's ruling, and had no discuss ion

0'

Ostler's arg um en ts against th is decision .
The common law sta ndard allows expert testimony to be excluded '
it concerns informatio n which in within the common knowledge of the
JUry.

Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of

emergency lanes (and no do ubt at one time read a description of them) an
si nce we can understand the "moth phenomeno n" and no doubt relate it to
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them.
Howeve r, under Ru le 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thi .
requirement is relaxed.

It is no"" no longer necessary to show th at the

expert knows something that the jury doesn 't know, a ll that is necessary
is that the expert be able to make th e facts perspicuous to the jury and
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case.
Rule 702 states
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge wil l assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witne ss qualified as an expert
by know ledge, skill, expe rience, training or
educa tion may te stify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise . (Emphasis added.)
Under Rul e 702, an expert can be employed if
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact in understand in g evidenc e that is simp ly
difficu l t
[though)
not
beyond
ordinary
understand ing.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd
Cir . 1985)
(Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18) .
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues th at the jury was fully capable of
understanding all the excluded evidence , but that it was essential to have
that evidence placed clearly before them.

Specifically:

1)

Members of

the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might
think possible only for dr iver who was in fact asleep.

2)

Th ere is no

reason to suppose that the ju rors knew about the different reactions
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights,

blinking tail-lights, and

flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like
that at issue.

3)

It is unclear that the average driver actually

understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not).

4)

Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the
sligh test id ea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to
significantly high er sta nda rd s th an are ordinary drivers.
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand , not only did the
Jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as
the higher common law standard requires).

Not knowing these facts has a

clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part,
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liabi lity.
Yet the tria l judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that
no expertise was needed to understand it.

The Court of Appeals argues

that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial
judge's ruling.

It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide

discretion in such matters; and that to overrule .the trial judge's decision
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of thi s
discretion.
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler' s
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's ca se .

Affidavit of Patricia
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The Cou rt of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could
take:

each and every piece of ev ide nce taken in isolation wo uld by itself

make or break the case. H oweve r, as indicated above , Ostler's argument is
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument.

In denying

Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell h is side of th
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to
make an essentially comparative judgment.
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with
only one case available.

In short, the jury was to make a comparative

ruling when the available alternatives consist of only
A to nothing).

Q..!}&.

case (comparin ~

In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its

decision was whether Wheeler'S story made sense; since they had no
alternative account of the s ituation , they could not compare that story
w ith another sensible story to see if o ne was a better account of what
happened.

Having concluded that Wheeler'S story was coherent, as it is,

the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler.
allowed access to Ostler's

If they had been

evidence, in virtue of the form of the new

deliberation (comparing A to B, whe re A and B are two different
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a
failure to read the. briefs carefully .
Point II and Point III
Rpstricted cross -examination of Wheeler concernlnO search for a place to
\lrinate
Wheeler's violation of federa l reaulations (10-, 15-, and 70- hour rules)
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment by bad act
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony.

The

trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant.

Ostler'S claim i

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
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that thi s

IS

liability_

The Co urt of Appeals offers not hing new on this, falling back

a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and

once again on the sta nd that if an issue is related to negligence, it is
appropriately excluded_

There is no evidence that the Court of Appeal s

appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the te st imony_
Po int IV
Mi sstatements du ri no closi no defendant's closino statement
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the iss ue
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a drive r might at some
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his
truck at just that time _
[T]he foreseeability question is:
How was Stan
Whee ler expected to foresee that at that precise
tim e , if as M r_ Oe8ry said, one in a billion chances
that it would happen right at that particular time-(Ouoted in Op inion, p_ 8)_
Th is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability ; if it were, no one would
ever be able to fo resee any thing_
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to
direct the juror's to their inst ructions_

He did not rule on the objection,

clearly leaving the misstatement u nco rrected _ In some cases this might
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it
causes harm_

The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to

the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear,
complicated and difficult to understand_

Th is will be discussed in more

detail unde r Point X below_
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together
with Point V_ The Court of Appeals notes that th e jury was directed to its
instructions , and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm _
This decision and the re asoni ng beh ind it reflects the Co urt of Appea ls'
fai lure to take the misstatement and its correct ion in context, viz_ the

Aifidavit of Pat ri cia

Page 14

anna

larger co ntext of the legal iss ues involved in the jury's deliberations an,
the fact that their in struction s on these matters we re unclear and
confusing.
Po int V
Who Pay s
This

IS

related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading

statement made during closing.

Here there is on ly an implication that tt-.

defendants would have to payout of their own pockets; hence it is les s
clearly misleading than in the cas e of Point IV where the misinform atio l
was clearly stated .

The Court of Appeals ' ruling on this point seems we

taken; unfortunately bec ause Point IV was treated in conjunction with
this,

the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV.

Point VII
Jury given in cor rect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares Qr
triangles
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C .
regulations requ iring that they be set out were read tQ Jury.
Whenever a vehicle is stQpped upon the shoulder of
a highway from any cause Qther than necessary
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible,
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning
devices [flare s or reflective triangle s] (I. C.C. rule,
quoted in Appeal, p. 41).
Therefore , it is clear that Whe ele r had a duty to set out the
devices.

However, th e jury was clearly instructed that this was not so.

In stead they were told that the regUlations required that the d evices be
set out only if th e driver wa s parked for 10 minutes or longer QL if parkl
less than 10 minutes , depending on circumstances.
However if you find that defendant Wheeler wa s
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to

Affidavi t of Patricia Hann:
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not

Wheel er

should

neverthe less have set out the flares or triangles
under the ex isting circ um stances (appeal p. 42).
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the
driver's judgment.

The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even

i1. substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relate s only to
negligence.

Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.

Ostle r's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g.,
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the
actual rul e clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary
drivers.
Further, it is not to the point to say that fa ilure to set out warning
devices is related to neglig ence; of course it is.
that it is also related to proximate cause;
been stated clearly and correctly.

The point, once again, is

on that ground it should have

It does not help the Court of Appeals'

judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation
was stated correctly.

In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply

left with two conflicting state ments, both dealing with w highly relevant
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict.
Point I X
Video taoe demonsiration
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause.

Since

these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the
"cause" (Wheele r' s truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are a sked to determine the truth

Affid a vit of Patricia
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ln a

of a counterfactual (a "con tra ry to th e facts" or a "what if" case).

Th e

idea is to see what wa s contributed to th e s ituation by the negligent ac t;
one asks, "b ut for [the parked truck] what would have tran sp ired?" or
"what if the truck hadn 't been there; what would have happened then? "
Such determinations ar e notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to se e
how a v id eo showing a sce ne very mu c h like w hat seems likely to have
obta in ed a t th e time of the accid e nt, but without th e truck in the
eme rgency lane, cou ld have been anything but helpful.
The trial cou rt di sallowed the video on two grounds.

First, that the

video did not meet the req uirements of a re-enac tment; it was not simila

enough to the in cident to co unt as a re-enactment.

Second, th at it was

just "specu lation" ( Opini on , p. 5), and as such would not help the jury .
The s'e co nd is either mi sguided , or if not mi sgu ided then such as to
call fo r a through-going revi si on of leg al standards.

In deciding th ese

issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the
truck in fact not been then:; , th ere would be facts to cons ider , but then
the re would be no case requiring a decision.

If the reason for disallowin g

the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the
dete rmination itself, not the video, that is confusing.
Therefore, everything rests on th e first ground; and this is in fact
the ground most d iscussed by th e Co urt of Appeals.

He re Ostler argues

that the s tand a rd of similarity applies only to re-e nac tm ents, where an
attempt is m ade to com e as close as poss ible to du plicating the actua l
acc iden t.

In suc h a cas e, similarity wou ld be very rele vant and shou ld be

taken very seriously. Howeve r, this w as not the in te ntio n in this case.
Here it is appa rent and unargued that the v id eo depicted a sce ne that coulC

DQl have occurred on the nig ht father Ostle r ran into Wh eele r's truck; the
point of the v id eo is .illu strative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on
the iss ue of proximate ca use.
In rulin g on the appeal , the Court of Appeals applied a thre e-prong
test:

relevance, simil arity and non-co nfusing. It decided that the v id eo

failed th e first tw o.

It th e n co nsidered the argu m ent that th e v ideo was
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not a re-enactm ent, but an illustration;

and upheld the tria l court's ruling

on the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or
th at the trial court abused its discret ion.
Once again, the Court of Appeals mi sses the po int.

The very nature

of decision of proximate cause and supe rs ed ing intervening causes is by
its nature confusing.

In view of

the vast body of evidence already denied

th e jury for its de li be rations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim
that showing them th e video woule! be confusing.

At th is stage of the trial

the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making th e point that
Wheeler's truck was not simply somethino

for father Ostler's truck to hit

(as though he would have hit somethi ng else or rolled over if it hadn't been
th ere) , but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident
of the sort that occurred.

Th e video makes the point that Ostler's injuries

are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Whe eler's truck is a necessary
causal factor.

Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see

this point.
Point X
Couri's instructions on intervening causes was incorreci.
Ostler objected on several points:
1.

"In tervening independent cause " was undefin ed.

2.

Foreseeability was not the only test of causat ion

3.

Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to

be the stand a rd of foreseeability.
4.

The in structions were confus ing .

6 If some thin g is causa lly overdetermined, it wi ll occur whelher or not one of the causes
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleepin g pills and alter I take them you
fatally shoot me, we can say Ihat my deatll was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot
me, I die.

Affidavit of Patricia
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were
th erefo re harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof
that the in struct ions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion.
Th is decision one aga in fails to take account of dual nature of

SOfT

of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whi,
the instruction s were given and the evidence

availabl~

to the jury.

The

jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I).

Taken in this context, Ostler's

case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructior
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals ' reasoning indicates.
Point XI
Directed verdict on causation
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked
del iberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on whic h they were
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the
Judge were unclear and confusing.

In view of this it seems at least

unreasonable to ask the jury to re ach a decision on the matter; however
the case at hand the error runs even deeper.
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th ,
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a simi la '
verdict on causation.

The defendant's respon se claims that if this were

allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and
causation; this is simply not so.

Ostler argues only that in this case is

the re an implication from neg lig ence to causation; this does not imply
that there is such an implication

1fT

every case.

For example, I might park negligently with resp ect to the wild
anima ls in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked

~
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nex t to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plumm eted over in any
case.

The case at hand is not of this sort.

causation.

Here the negligence implies

This is shown by ask ing Yill..a1 it wa s that made the act of

parking in the emergency lane neg ligent.

Th e answer is two-fo ld:

to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2)

1)

risk

subjecting Ostler to

the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60).
Thus, causation is implied by neg ligence.
The rea lization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that Injury.

Th e standards cited

by Ostler clearly support this co ntention 7
Ostler goes on to argue that in thi s case the standard for a directed
verdict is met:

reasonable minds cannot disagree.

They cannot disagree

because the answer follows by definitio n from the earlier verdict.
Appellant's Substitute Brief,

p. 62, Ostler makes this clear:

In the

"The fact

that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated
by th e following question: What ri sks of harm (other than accidents with
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are
apparent."

Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree;

otherwise, we would all be A stu dents in math ematics and logic.

If we

are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even
though we are reasonable
The present case is of this unfortunate sort.

The jurors were led to

draw the wrong conclus ion not because it was an open question, but
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw
th e correct conclusion.

They were neither allowed to judge the issue of

causation as a simpl e matter of fact, because they were denied access the
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III , VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed.

7 The illustrative cases in Restatement o f Torts, 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially
clear and illuminating on the issue a t hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44. )
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for th eir decision to rejec t the appea l
are confusing.
taken to be a

First it is stated that generally proximate causation is
dete rm ination of fact to be made by the jury.

Thi s may be

true in gene ral : but Ostler has argued that it is not true in thi s case.
Moreove r, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to
relevant evidence and could not make the determination .

The Court of

Appeals' decision does not address this a rgum ent.
Second the Court of Appeals states that ''' proximate cause ' is one of
the essential elements of a negligence action " (Op ini on, p. 10).

This

implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence.
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason
for denying that appeal.
makes this citation.
unm otivated.

It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals

What follows on p. 10 of the Opi ni on is equally

It seems correct, but neithe r adds to nor contrad icts any of

Ostler's a rgum ents or contentions .

In short , th e entire section on p. 10

stands as an enigma in the Court of Appea ls' reasoning .
Conclusions
As already stated, it is difiicult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judg es.

I can only conclude that in

re ach ing its dec ision, the Court of Appeals failed to take in to account
many important aspects of the arg um e nts made in the appeal : at several
points the Co urt of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fa il s to
address the arguments made in the appeal.

Du e to time pressures or

misunderstandings, a single individual might fa il to grasp the poi nts at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments: however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals cou ld al l have made th e same errors
in analys is.

I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a

sing le judge (Bench), and that th e other two judges signed it without
g iving the brief s the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
de serve d and requ ired.
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M. Dayle Jeffs, ItG 1655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

I
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RALPH OSTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

MOTION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS
AGAINST ROBERT J. DEBRY
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT
I·
RALPH OSTLER

ALBINA TRANSFER CO . , INC .
F & R ROE, INC., and
STM-H_EY E. WHEELER,

t

Court of Appeals No.:
880-0228-CA

Defendants

'. ': .

COMES NOW the defendants/respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc. , F & R
Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler, by and through counsel M. Dayle Jeffs, and hereby move
the Court to impose sanctions against attorney Robert J. DeEry in his capacity as counsel to
plaintiff/appellant, Ralph Ostler, for all pleadings filed after the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals in favo r of said defendants on September 8, 1989, as such sanctions are proper under
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann . §78-27-56 (1989), and for attorneys fees and costs incurred by
defendants/respondents in responding to such pleadings.

I

Sanctions to be awarded herein in

r:f~r_

accordance with the memorandum in support of this motion, and the exhibits attached thereto
and by reference made a part hereof.

d

Dated and signed thisE day of April, 1991.

C\_

p?~

?WAJ~~
M. Dayle Jeff

2

(
M. Dayle Jeffs, ItGl655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAILING CERTIFICATE

RALPH OSTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
ST ANLEY E. WHEELER,

Court of Appeals No.:
880-0228-CA

Defendants

I hereby certify that the original of Motion to IMpose Sanctions on Robert J.
DeBry in his capacity as Counsel for Ralph Ostler and Memorandum in Support of this Motion
was hand delivered to the Clerk of the Court, Utah Court of Appeals and a copy to the below
named party by hand delivery, this date, April 12, 1991, to the following address:
Robert J. DeBry
DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Murray, Utah 84107

-%t

./
G-~
Je~~

IJ~

M. Dayle
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A08~9
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
~252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

OSTLER,

~.LPH

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST
ROBERT J. DEBRY AS COUNSEL FOR
P~.INTIFF R~LPH OSTLER

MEMO~~DUM

)

ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
ST~~LEY E. WrlEELER,

)
)
)

)

Case No: 910246 - CA

)

Defendants.

)

--------------------------- )--------------------------~.RGUMENT

Plaintiff'

relies upon the aff idavits of Carl S. Hawkins

(Exhibit A) and Samuel D. Thurman (Exhibit B).

D~.TED this

21

day of June, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
A~torne v

"/

for Plaintiff
//

, / /1 ,_/

By:

/J~(

,,' /

r~" /H ,;;; .J ?! Df -r
ROBERT J. DEERY

'For ease of reaQlng and to avoid misunderstanding, this motion
will adopt the heading and nomenclature of Mr. Jeffs' petition.
However , as a technical matter, Albina is neither a defendant nor
a respondent herein; rather, Albina is the petitioner.
Furthermore ,

Ostler is not the plaintiff hereini

rather,

Ostler is the

nominal respondent herein.

f

.:-

~~

~

r-.

~

. -. ,.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
foregoing

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
Y.EMORANDUM

AG.l>.INST ROBERT J .

IN

DEBRY

OPPOSITION
;'.S

TO

PETITION

FOR

S~~CTI ON S

COUNSEL FOR PT .b.INTTFF RF.LPH

OSTLER

"9 /

(Ostler v . Albina, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid , this';:;
day of June, 1991 , to the following:
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 No r th 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

0566 - 159\jn
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEERY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)
)

RALPH OSTLER,

)
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL D.

THURY~

)

vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
Defendants.

Case No: 910246-CA

)

-----------------------------)---------------------------STATE OF UTAH
ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
My name is Samuel D.
statements under oath:

Thurman.

I

make the following

1.
I am presently on the faculty of Law at the
University of California , Hastings College of Law, San Francisco.
This is my curriculum Vitae:
Co-author the Legal Profession, Thurman, Phillips and
Cheatham (Foundation Press) widely adopted in law schools across
the country.
Articles on legal ethics in law reviews and other legal
publications.
Member, American Bar Association conunission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission).
Model Rules of
Professional Conduct drafted by this commission and adopted in most
states, including Utah.
Who's Who in America.
Who's Who in the World.

I

,,

Who's Who in American Law.
Head of the three national law school accreditation
organizations (President, Association of American Law Schools;
President, National Order of the Coif; Chairman, A.B.A. Council of
the section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar) .
Degrees: A.B. University of Utah , Phi Beta Kappa, High
Honors; J. D. Stanford Law School, Order of the Coif; L. L. D. ,
Uni v ersity of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; International
University, California Western School of Law; University of Utah.
Teaching subj ects:
tional Law, Evidence.

Legal Profess ion,

Torts,

Consti tu-

Taught at : Utah, Stanford, Pepperdine, Texas, Louisiana
State, New York University, Michigan, and University of California,
Hastings College of Law (currently as a member of the 65 Club).
Associate and Acting Dean, Stanford Law School.
Dean , University of Utah College of Law .
Distinguished Professor , Utah.
Samuel D. Thurman Professorship established at Utah .
Holder of Marion Rice Ki r kwood Professorship at Stanford.
Justice Hugo Black Lecturer, University of Alabama.
Recipient of the 1990 Robert J. Kutak Professional
Responsibility Award from the American Bar Association.
American Law Institute Life Member.
Fellow,

F~erican

Bar Foundation .

Board of Directors, National Legal Services Corporation
(Presidential Appointment) .
Board of Directors , California Law Revision commission.
Adviser, Restatement of Torts, Second.
Editorial Board, Foundation Press, University Casebook
Series (the largest publisher of law school course books) .
2

Member, Council
Responsibility (CLEPR).

on

Legal

Education

for

Professional

2.
I have been asked to render an opinion as to whether
Robert J. DeBry acted ethically and in good faith in submitting an
affidavit by Professor Patric ia Hanna in the Ostler personal injury
case (781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989)). Although a cogent argument
can be made that the trial court in Ostler was clearly in error in
refusing to direct a verdict against defendant on the issue of
legal (proximate) cause, that is not the primary issue before this
Court at the present time .
This Court is asked to determine
whether Mr. DeBry engaged in unprofessional conduct in filing with
the Utah Court of Appeals an affidavit in connection with a
Petition for Rehearing in Ostler.
3.
The affidavit in question was that of Dr. Patricia
Hanna, Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Utah .
Although Dr. Hanna is not a lawyer there can be little question as
to her expertise in the field of logic and causation.
Nor can
there be much doubt that the primary issue in Ostler was legal
cause, one of the most misunderstood concepts in the law ,
involving, as it does, complex interrelations between causation and
public policy.
It is a subject that continues to baffle the best
minds . Dr. Hanna's affidavit was clearly directed to the subject
of causation, her field of expertise .
4.
The major thrust of plaintiff's original personal
injury cause of action was statutory negligence based upon the
acknowledged violation of Sec. 41-6-103 (1) (i) Utah Code Ann.,
prohibi ting the stopping of a vehicle on a controlled access
highway. Violations of criminal statutes are generally found to be
negligence per se in a tort action if (1) the statute is a safety
measure, (2) the injury stems from the kind of accident foreseen by
the legislature, and (3) the party injured was in a class sought to
be protected by the legislature .
(Restatement of Torts, Second,
Sec. 286.)
If all three criteria are found , as they must be in
this
case,
negligence
should
be
found,
usually
Der
se.
(Restatement of Torts, Second, Sec. 288B.)
The trial court in
Ostl er so directed the jury.
5.
Turning next to proximate (l egal ) cause, the first
requirement, that of actual cause (substantial factor), is clearly
met in Ostler and the question of whether legal cause is present
depends upon a judicial determination of whether there are polic y
reasons to limit the liability of a negligent defendant whose
negligence is an actual cause of plaintiff's injury.
(Restatement
of Torts, Second, Sec. 431.) In Ostler there appear to be no such
policy reasons.
Instead , it is a rare case where the three
3

criteria referred to in the preceding paragraph are found by a
court to exist and where proximate cause is not found. In Ostler ,
proximate cause shou ld have been directed by the trial court .
6.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with that conclusion, Mr. DeBry, as a careful lalo.'Yer, could have reasonably
believed that a directed verdict on legal cause was justified and
that he had good reason to focus his Petition for Rehearing on that
i ssue . As a part of that Petition, the filing of an affida v it by
an expert in causation cannot be deemed unprofessional conduct,
even if that expert is a non - lawyer. In the landmark case of Brown
v. Board of Educati on of Topeka , 3~7 u .s. 483 ( 1954 ) , the United
states Supreme Court. relied heavily upon the testimony of nonlalo.'Y er professiona l s in reaching the conclusion that segregated
public schools were inherently " unequal" and unconstitutional.
I
have no hesitancy in expressing my opinion that Mr . DeBry violated
no ethical standards or duty of good faith in procuring and filing
a non-lawyer affidavit in the Ost l er case.
7.
Turning next to the question of the substance of Dr.
Hanna's affidavit, many charges are made in defendant 's Petition
for sanctions (pp. 4 - 12) . Included in these charges a r e "fr ivolous
appeal, "

tlpurpose

of

delay, "

Itbad

faith,"

"without merit, " "no

reasonable likelihood of success," "harass defendant ," " increase
cost of litigation, " "acted unreasonably, " "criticism of thought
processes of the court ," " motion filed without reasonable inquiry
as to whether it is well grounded in fact or warranted by existing
law or a good faith extension, modification , or reversal of
existing law. " The Petition concludes: "Mr. DeBry ' s pleadings were
without merit an d were not brought in good faith as to their merit
based on the objective standard." (p . 12.)
8.
I have read and studied with care the several br iefs
in the Os t l er case, the Opinion of t h e Court of Appeals, the
Petition for Rehearing ( including the Hanna affidavit ) and the
Petit.ion for Sanctions. As a result of this study it is my opinion
that the Hanna affidavit in no way justifies any of the charges
made by defendant's counsel . Although Dr. Hann a ' s analysis of the
case might be termed hyperbolic in places and her criticism severe,
how many times have losing counsel complained that the court did
not give their " briefs the careful and detailed analysis which they
deserved and required?"
Certainly such complaints have not been
deemed sufficient to justify the imposition of attorney ' s fees on
the attorney for the losing party.
9.

Justice Brennan , writing for the majority in In re

SaW'.'er, 360 u.s. 622, 635 (1959) stated : "The public attribution of

honest

error

to

the

judiciary

is
4

no

cause

for

professional

discipline in this country."
Dr. Hanna's assertions that there
must have been a "breakdown in the decision making process" and
that the opinion in Ostler was "logically unsupportable " were
statements less caustic than those held privileged in Sa.~er.
10. Dr. Hanna's charges were central to the theme of her
opinion which was submitted to a court having power to grant a
rehearing.
She had access to all of the underlying materials in
the case and her opinion, covering 21 pages, was not rendered
superficially .
It was not disseminated to the public or to the
press and was set forth in a scholarly, logical manner. It was not
unprofessional or in bad faith for Mr. DeBry to procure and file
such an affidavit.
11 .
Even if Dr. Hanna's analysis is deemed more critical
than those customarily seen in legal proceedings, Mr. DeBry had an
affirmative duty to zealously pursue his client ' s objectives. (See
Preamble to Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: "As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system.")
Especially in a Petition for Rehear ing,
where the chances of success are usually remote, the attorney
should be at liberty to utilize more imaginative procedures and
advance more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration. Mr.
DeBry took a chance , but not an unprofessional chance, in using an
expert in logical analysis, a major component of proximate cause.
Again, I conclude that Mr. DeBry's use of the non-lawyer affidavit
in this case was consistent with, certainly not in violation of,
his professional obligations.

DATED this

/x2l~ay

of June, 1991.

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this
~~~~_~~~_______

, 1991.

day of

cz£:) -~

. NOTARY

My Commission Expires:

( :3

PUBLIC

~RESIDING IN: ~~d·~~~\~~'__~(~tk~~__~C£=c~~~~_
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rTJ..'1T' P!J3!J; •S.Ai : c! UTAH
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER
AF FIDAVIT OF
CARL S . HAWKINS

Plaint iff ,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO ., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER

Case No. 910246-CA

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
UTAH COUNTY
My name is Carl S . Hawkins.
under oath:

I make the following statements

1. I am a Professor of Law and former Dean of the J. Reuben
Clark Law School,

Brigham Young University.

I have taught Torts

for the las t eighteen years at B. Y.U . and for sixteen years before
that at the University of Michigan Law School.
three

editions

of

nationally-published

I am a co - author of

casebooks

on

Torts

and

Advanced Torts, and I have published articles on Torts in several
professional journals.

I am a member of the bar of the District of

Columbia,

states

and

of

the

of

Illinois,

Michigan,

and

Utah

(inactive status).
2. At the request of Robert J. DeBry , I have read the opinion
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the above case,

and I have also

read the briefs of the parties in order to form an opinion as to
the nature of the Torts issues involved in this case as it stood
when Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing with the Court of
Appeals.

3.

This

case

involves,

among

other

issues,

fundamental
including the question of whether

questions of negligence theory,

the scope of liability for violation of a particular legal rule
should be determined by the court as a matter of legal policy, or
whether that issue should be given to the jury, as if it were an
issue of fact,

under a "proximate cause " instruction.

District Court in this case did the latter.

The Fourth

The opinion of the

Court of Appeals obscures this basic legal question as to the scope
of

1 iabil i ty

by

intrinsic error

addressing

it

in the trial

in

terms

of

whether

inst~uction

court ' s

there

,"as

to the jury on

independent, intervening cause (Instruction No. 27 ) .
4. There is sUbstantial judicial and scholarly authority whic h
holds that,

before factual issues of causation are given to the

jury in negligence cases, the court must determine as a matter of
law whether the defendant owes a duty of reasonable Care to the
plaintiff,

and ",'hether the particular rule "'hich defendant
allegedly violated was meant to guard against the particular risk
of injury that plaintiff incurred.

United

States,

.".ssocia tes,

A.2d

338

524

(R.1.

256 So.2d 620

Inc. ,

Insurance Co. , 267 So.2d 714

See,

( La.

for example ,

1975 ) ;

Hill

1972 ) ;

Laird v.

D'Ambra v.

v.

Lundin

&

Travelers

(La. 1972); Stoneburner v. Greyhound

Corp., 375 P.2d 812 (Or. 1962) concurring opinion of Goodwin, J.;
Thode,

Tort Analysis:

Duty - Risk versus Proximate Cause,

and the

Rational Allocation of Functions Bet",een Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah
L. Rev.

1; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence La\''',

Mich . L.Rev. 543
61 Col.

L. Rev.

60

( 1962); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law,
14 01

Under this analytical method,

( 19 61).

the

issues in this case could be set forth in the follo",ing ",ay:
(1)

Does

the

driver

of

,

Interstate high",ay owe a

,j

persons using the high",ay?

;

j

,t

1

1

!~
;

(2)

a

truck

and

semitrailer

on

an

duty of reasonable care to other

If so, does that duty require compliance with Utah Cod e

Ann. Sec. 41-6-103, '.'hich prohibits the stopping of a v ehicle

on a controlled access highway -- that is , was this statutory
provision meant to guard against the

risk of

injury to a

passenger in another vehicle that inadvertently ran into the
rear of the parked vehicle?
(3) Did defendant violate that duty?
(4)

Was

there

a

substantial

causal

connection

between

defendant's conduct and plaintiff ' s injury?
( 5) What damages resulted from plaintiff ' s injury and what
proportion thereof wa s attributable to defendant's
comparative negligence?

be

5. Under this analytical method , questions (1) and (2) would
questions of law fo r the court in deciding the scope of

defendant ' s legal duty and whethe r the rule invoked by the
plaintiff prov i des protection against the kind of injury that
occurred. This approach would not necessarily result in a decision
in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the court would undoubtedly
answer question (1)

in the affirmative, it could conceivably make

a negative decision on question (2) ,

taking responsibility for a

clear legal decision that the statutory rule against stopping on a
contr20lled access highway was not meant to protect passengers in
another vehicle that ran into the rear of the parked truck .
But
when the issue is put in this way, the court might very well decide
that the duty
collisions .

should cover such risks,
Unless

the

following

in order to deter such

vehicle

is

intentionally

or

recklessly driven into the parked vehicle, the most effective way
to reduce the incidence of such rear-end shoulder collisions would
be to deter conscious decisions to park on the shoulder rather than
trying to control the wider range of variables, both mechanical and
human, that may cause other vehicles to drift inadvertently onto
the shoulder.
effect,

asked

Plainti ff' s
for

such

a

Petition for Rehearing
legal

determination

Restatement of Torts (Second), sections 442 - 447.

by

(pp. 6-7),

in

reference

to

6. Question (3), the breach of duty or negligence issue, would
usually be a fact i ssue for the jury, but in this case it was
undisputed

that

defendant

trucker

had

violated

the

statutory

provision that prohibits stopping on the controlled access highway .
Once this provision is construed as intended to prevent this kind
o f rear-end collision, it follows that defendant's violation of the
statute

was negligence, as a matter of law.

Restatement of Torts

(Second) , Section 286.
The trial judge recognized this by
directing a verdict against defendant on the negligence issue .
7.

Question

(4) ,

as

to

the

defendant's conduct and plaintiff ' s

issue

for

the

plaintiff's

jury,

but

injuries

in

this

resulted

causal
injury,

case

from

'

connection

between

might also be a fact.

~

1.<..

the

undisputed

vlas

collision

that

,,' ith

the

semitrailer unit that defendant had parked in the "recovery lane"
of the highway . Once the court has decided that the statutory rule
which defendant violated was meant to guard against this kind of
injury,

jury should not be invited to nullify
determination by importing questions of "proximate
11

the

intervening cause ll

that

legal

cause"

into a causal relation instruction , when,

and
in

fact, the causal connection between defendant's negligent conduct
and plaintiff's injury was beyond dispute.
Thus, by this line of
analy si s,

the

trial

plaintiff

on the

court

should

issue of

have

directed

causation as well

as

a

verdict

on the

issue

for
of

defendant's negligence, as argued in Appellant ' s substitute Brief,
pp .

59-65.

disputed

The only issues left

factual

questions

as

to

for

jury submission would be

plaintiffs '

damages

and

the

proportionate amount attributable to the truc k driver I s comparative

negligence.
8. The suggestion , that the jury could have found that Stephen
Ostle r's inattentiveness "be came the sole proximate cause of the
collision"

(781

P . 2d

at

451),

,,'ould

analytical approach outlined above.

have

no

place

under

the

It is undisputed that the

physical obstacle against which plaintiff ' s vehicle collided was
placed where it was by defendant 's negligent conduct.

The notion

~

\

that something else could be the " sole proximate cause " may be
understood only in the context of an approach that asks the jury to
decide , under the name of "proximate cause," the ultimate policy
question as to the scope of legal liability for violation of the
statute, even though defendant ' s negligent conduct was a cause of
plaintiff ' s injury.
9.

For the purpose of the pending Petition For Sanctions, I
assume it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court sho uld
have determined the scope 0: liability as suggested above, instead
of giving that
instruction t

issue to the

nor

whether

differently if it had.
1<lhether

there

Plaintiff ' s

was

la;.'yer

jury under an

the

case

would

"intervening ca u se"
have

been

decided

It should only be necessary to determine

arguable
was

merit

trying

in

to

these

raise

by

Tort
his

issues

that

Petition

For

Rehearing and whether such issues were raised by appropriate means.
In my opinion, this case did raise fundamental questions of Tort
law which the Petition For Rehearing was trying to bring to the
Court of Appeals ' attention.
10. I am famili ar with the affidavit by Samuel D. Thurman in
which

he

gives

his

opinion

(as

an

expert

on

legal

ethics),

including the following statement:
"Even if Dr. Hanna's affidavit is deemed more critical than
those customarily seen in legal proceedings , Mr. DeBry had an
cffirmative duty to zealously pursue his clientls object.i.ves

Especially in a Petition for Rehearing, where the chances
of

success are

usually

liberty to utilize

mo~e

remote,

the

attorney

should be

at

imaginative procedures and advance

more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration."
Mr. DeEry may have felt it necessary to resort to the "imaginative
procedure" of filing Dr . Ha nna 's affidavit ;"ith his Pe tition :or
Reconsideration, because
opinion

(781

P.2d at

0:

the way in which the Court of Appeals '

450-~51 )

had

obscured the basic scope of

.

liabil i ty i s sue s which he had tried to raise on appeal.
I n my
opinion , Dr . Hanna ' s criticism of the Court ' s analytical method
tries to address , in non - legal terms , issues that would be
recognized by respected legal authorities as serious questions of
Tort law implicated in the Court ' s decision.

BY~
Carl S . Ha,lkins

Subscribed and sworn to before me the

'5;:z;?
NOtary Public

Residing in : "'" JI1i. l ... ,,- c.--'"~

2>-

My commission expires - - - " " ' -&:"- ' -q.~r
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--
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COURT OF APPEP.LS
)

RALPH OSTLER,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC . , and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST ROBERT J,
DEBRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, RALPH
OSTLER

)
)
)

)
Defendants.

Case No: 910246-CA

)

---------------------------)--------------------------ST~,TE

OF UTAH
ss:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
My name

is Michael

Goldsmith.

I

give the

follmdng

testimony under oath:

Introduction
1,

I am a p!"ofessor of law at the J. Rueben Clark La ..'

School, Brigham Young University,
2.

At the request of Robert J, DeBry, I have reviewed

various materials concerning the motion for sanctions presently

!.

pending before this court.

r',.

3.

My

opinion,

governing legal principles,

based

both

on

these

materials

and

is that the motion for sanctions is

unwarranted.

~
i- -

·r .:;:j ~. ;
' .
r

,"," ,' ',-,~.

u

4.

For the convenience of the court, this affidavit is

organized into six parts.

Part I submits for your consideration my

qualifications as an expert witness.
to the issues raised by this case.
principles governing

expert

Part II explains my approach
Part III reviews admissibility

testimony.

Part

IV

considers the

exclusion of expert testimony on foreseeability.

Part V discusses

the

so-called

exclusion

phenomenom."

of

expert

Finall y,

testimony

on

the

"moth

Part VI addresses ...;hether sanctions are

warranted in this case.
I

General Qualifications
5.
then,

I

I have taught evidence at B.Y.D. since 1985.

Before

taught evidence at Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville,

Tennessee.
6.

In 1984, I co-authored with Irving Younger a case-

book entitled Principles of Evidence.

The book has been adopted by

numerous professors at other schools, and will soon be published in
its second edition.

7.

I

have

lectured on evidence law to students and

practitioners throughout the country.
8.
tion

Because evidence law interfaces with civil litiga-

generally,

Indeed,

I

I

am

also

familiar

have published on this

.'ith

subject,

Rule

11

principles.

and called for more

aggressive application of sanctions to curtail abusive litigation.
2

\

See

Goldsmith

Context,

&

Keith ,

1986 B. Y. U.

ci vi 1

L . Rev .

RICO

Abuse:

55 , 92-97

The

.2>. 1 1 eaations

(19 8 6 ) ; Go l dsmith ,

in

civi l

RICO Reform: The Ba sis For Compromise, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 827 , 881 - 82
(1987).

within the context of the general debate over civil RICO

reform, I have also testified about this subject before the United
States Congress.

RIC O Ref o rm, Hearings before the Committee on the

Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of Representatives,

99th Cong.,

1st

&

2nd Sess.

Part 2,

Serial 140,

at 1261

(1986) .
9.

My curriculum vita is attached as exhibit 1.
II

Analvtical Approach
10 .

I have reviewed the following materials in connec -

tion with this case: a ) all appellate briefs submitted by counsel
through conclusion of the appellate process; b) Professor Hanna's
affidavit; c) the mot i on for sanctions and accompanying memorandum ;
d ) pert i nent portions of the record; e) the opinion rendered by the
Court of Appeals;

and

f)

the aff idavi ts

submitted by Dean Sam

Thurmond and Dean Carl Hawkins.
11.

Given

the

numerous

evidentiary

issues

raised on

appeal , I have confined my analysis to those matters deemed most
critical to the outcome of the case.
every evidentiary point of conflict.

3

Therefore, I did not consider

12.

Furthermore, although obj ecti vely reasonable grounds

support numerous issues raised in the petition for reconsideration,
Mr.

DeBry

has

requested

that

I

confine

my

analysis

to

those

evidentiary issues that clearly resulted in error by the Court of
Appeals.
13.

Before presenting this analysis,

I wish to state

that my remarks reflect neither disrespect for the Court nor an
intent to embarrass any of its members . '

If anything, I find the

motion for sanctions, filed more than a year after conclusion of
the

case,

exceedingly

peculiar.

The

thrust

of

the

apparently seeks to protect this Court from criticism.
Court of Appeals,

motion

The Utah

however , is a well respected institution,

and

hardly needs motions of this kind to protect its reputation.
14.

Furthermore, I undertook my analysis with the belief

that outstanding jurists both welcome constructive criticism and,
not

infrequently,

take

action

to

rectify

previous

mistakes.

Justice Jackson , for example, once observed:
But if I have agreed to any prior decision which
forecloses what now seems to be a sensible construction
of this Act, I must frankly admit that I was unaware of
it .
Under these circumstances, except for any
personal humiliation involved in admitting that I do not
always understand the opinions of this Court, I see no

'Mr. Debry also assures me that he will file a motion to seal
the affidavits submitted by the experts supporting his position.
4

•

"
reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I
was unconsciously wrong yest erda y.'
15 .
remarks,

I

Keeping

,,' ithin

the

spirit

of

Justice

Jackson ' s

believe that the published opinion committed serious

error in at least two critical respects: a ) the exclusion of
testimony

concerning

the

foreseeability

of

collisions

eA~ert

in

the

emergency lane; and b) the exclusion of expert testimony concerning
the so-called " moth phenomenon. "

To appreciate the basis for my

conclusion, the evidentiary principles governing expert testimony
must be briefly reviewed.
III

Admissibilitv Princioles Governina Expert Testimonv

16.

The Rules of Evidence modify common law doctrine by

liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony .

Before the

enactment of Rule 702 , "courts frequently asserted that there was
no

need

for

expert

testimony

unless

the

issue

to

which

the

2Massachuse~ts

(Jackson, J.) .

v. united states, 333 U.S . 611, 639-~0 (19~8)
On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated:

Precede nt , however , is not lacking for ways by which
a judge may reced e from a prior opinion that has proven
un~enable .
But an escape less self-depreciating
was taken by Lord Westbury, who , it is said rebu ffed a
barrister ' s reliance upon an earlier opinion of his
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed that a man of
my intelligence s hould have been guilty of giving such an
opinion." If there are other ways of gracefully and good
naturedly

surrendering

former

views

to

a

better

considered position, I invoke them all.
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 1 7 7-78 (1950)
5

(Jackson , J. ,).

testimony would be directed is 'not within the common knowledge of
the aver age layrr,an. '"
9 (1990).

3 Weinstein's Evidence sec. 702[02], at 702-

This standard no longer governs.

As Weinstein observes:

Must a court exclude expert testimony if the subject
is within the comprehension of the average juror? Such
a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness
expressed in Rule 702.
Firs~,
it assumes wrongly that
there is a bright line separating issues ;"ithin the
comprehension of juror s
from those that are not.
Secondly, even ;.'hen jurors are well equipped to make
judgrnen-.:s on -.:he basis of their common kno;.' ledge and
exper ience, experts may have specia lized knowledge to
bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful.
Id.

at 702-15

(emphasis added)

see D.

Louisell

C. Mueller,

&

3

Federal Evidence sec. 380, at 633 ( 1979 )
17.

Given

this

liberalized

standard,

"doubts

about

whether an exper-.:'s testimony will be useful should generally be
resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors
such

as

time

or

surprise

Evidence

sec.

702 [02J,

at

favoring

exclusion."

702-30.

This

approach

because " [t J he jury is intelligent enough,

The -:.rial

judge I s

ruling,

reviewed under an "abuse of discre1:ion l1

disturbed on appeal.
standard,

however,

Id. at 702 -22 & 26.

weinstein 1 s
is

warranted

aided by counsel,

ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations."
18.

3

to

Id.

however,
standard,

ordina:.-ily

is

and is rarely

The abuse of

discre~ion

does not apply if the trial court "rests its

decision on a misstatement of law.

11

Roe v . Deere and Co.

I

855 F.2d

151, 155 (3rd Cir. 1988). Under such circumstances, the ruling must
be examined for "legal error."

Id.
6

19.

Based on these principles, I believe that the trial

judge clearly abused his discretion in declining to admit expert
testimony

concerning

emergency lane.

the

foreseeability

of

a

collision

in

the

In addition, the trial judge's decision excluding

expert testimony on the "moth phenomenon" was both an abuse of
discretion and based on an incorrect legal standard.

These rulings

are discussed separately below.
IV
The Exclusion of Expert Testimonv on Foreseeabilitv
20.
Appellant

To establish proximate cause and foreseeability,

sought

to

following factors:

a)

introduce

expert

testimony

concerning

the

the purpose of the emergency lane; b)

the

fact that road designers recognize that vehicles will sometimes
drive into the emergency lane; c) that emergency lanes are designed
to provide a recovery zone for errant vehicles; and d) that truck
drivers are trained to know that errant vehicles may drive into an
emergency

lane ,

and,

thus,

are

instructed not to park in

such

lanes.
21.

The trial court rejected this evidence because it

would not be "help ful " to the jury .
22 .

In my judgment,

been very helpful to the jury.

Transcript, at 245, 254,& 293.

the excluded evidence would have
For example, most people probably

assume that emergency lanes are intended to provide an area to make
emergency repairs or to leave a car temporarily pending repairs.
7

Few of us know that such lanes are also designed to provide a
recovery zone for errant vehicles , much less that truckers receive
specific training on the need to keep such lanes open.

Expert

testimony

point.

Indeed,

ordinarily

would

be

necessary

to

make

this

I believe that such testimony would have been admissible

under the more stringent pre-Rules " necessity " standard applied by
many courts.
23.
issue

of

The Court of Appeals, however, never addressed the

helpfulness .

The

opinion

states

that

some

evidence pertained only to the question of negligence.

of

this

As th e

trial judge had dir e cted a verdict on the negligence issue,

the

Court of Appeals concluded that such evidence was properly rejected
as irrelevant.
24 .

117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.
As to the evidence bearing on foreseeability , the

Court of Appeals merely noted that the trial judge had rejected
this testimony because it "would not be particularly helpful to the
jury.

The [trial] court believed that the jury was as capable as

the expert
Rather

to make the determination of

than

review

this

issue ,

foreseeability. "

however ,

the

Court

of

Id.

Appeals

rejected the appeal because " plaintiff has failed to carry his
burden

of

shol.'ing

prejudicial. "
25.

that

the

claimed

error

was

substantial

and

Id.
By taking this approach , the Court of Appeals made

two fundamental mistakes.

First,
8

the Court failed to recognize

---,

that all of this evidence pertained to foreseeability .

The fact

that such evidence also bore upon negligence did not preclude its
relevance to foreseeability, which constitutes a separate element
of a tort claim.
N.E.2d

832 ,

834

See,
(N.Y.

e.a.,

Sheehan v.

citv of New York ,

1976)

("negligence

and

proximate

354

cause

frequently overlap in the proof and theory which support each of
them");

cf . unit ed States v.

Turkette,

("proof used to establish

452 U.S.

576,

583

(1981)

. separate elements may in particular

cases coalesce " ) .
26 .
this

Second, the Court failed to recognize that excluding

evidence

was

inherently

prejudicial

because

it

prevented

appellant from presenting the only available evidence on a critical
element of its case.

" [W]hen the erroneously excluded evidence

would have been the only or primary evidence in support of .
the

claim
Weinstein ' s

error

Evidence

sec.

extensive authority).
722 F.2d 1134,

1140

is

generally

103[06],

at

found

a

prejudicial."

103-70

(1990)

1

(citing

See also Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
(3d Cir.

1983)

(expert testimony "crucial; "

" [w] i thout it, plaintiffs could not establish causation. " ) ; Shad v.
Dean .htter Revnolds,
(exclusion
"prevented

of

expert

Inc. ,

799

testimony

F.2d 525 ,

530

prejudicial,

(9th Cir .
as

1986)

plaintiffs

from presenting their case to a jury") ; Linkstrom

v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269 , 271-272 (3d Cir. 1989) (exclusion
of expert testimony on causation deemed prejUdicial).
9

27.

Under such circumstances,

there is a

"reasonable

likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings . "
Slusher

v.

Ospital

bv

ospital,

777

P . 2d

( setting forth the general standard).3

43 7 ,444

Indeed,

(Utah

1989)

it makes no sense

to reject evidence as unhelpful to the jury and then to deem the
exclusion non-prejudicial when the jury returns a verdict directly
at odds with the proffered evidence.

v
The Exclusion of Expert Testimon v on the Moth Phenomenon
28.

Appellant sought to introduce evidence of the so -

called "moth phenomenon" to explain how a drowsy driver could have
been lured by flashing taillights to crash into appellees' truck.
Appellant ' s

Substitute

B~ief,

at 2-3 .

The trial rejected this

3Significantly, the "reasonable likel i hood " standard does not
require proof of a probability. State v. Kniaht , 734 P.2d 913, 920
(U tah 19 8 7 ) ( " [ T ) hought f ul reflection sugges~s that confidence in
the outcome may be undermined at some point SUbstantially sho~t of
the 'more probable than not ' portion of the spectrum " ) .
In the present case, the significance of the error was
compounded by the following improper statement, made by defense
cou nsel , du ring closing argument:
[ T ) he foreseeability ques~ion is: How was Stan wneeler
expected to foresee that at that precise time if, as Yu.
Debry said, one in a billon chances that it would happen
right at that particular time-117 Utah Adv. Rep. , at 17 . The Court of Appeals did not view this
remark as prejudicial, within the total co ntext , because of the
trial judge's ne u tral admonishment to the jury. rd. The excluded
expert testimony, howev er, would have explained to the jury why
such accidents are foreseeable generally and why truckers , in
particular, know to expect them.
10

evidence as unhelpful, lacking factua l foundation , and prejudicial .
117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
The Court of Appeals did not address separately the

29.

question

of

helpfulness under Rule

702.

Instead,

the opinion

implies that the trial judge merged this issue into his analysis of
foundation and prejudice. Id.

According to the opinion, the trial

judge reasoned that absent foundation,
unhelpful

and

prejudicial.

Id.

such testimony would be

The

Court

of

».ppeals

then

sustained the trial judge ' s ruling simply by finding no abuse of
discretion under Rule 403 .
30.

Id.

The tr ial court, however, did not merge his analysis
Transcript, at 245,

of helpfulness and foundation.

254,

293.

&

Therefore , the Court of Appeals should have treated these issues
separately.

1'.S

few

jurors

would

be

familiar

;"ith

the

" moth

phenomenon, " such expert testimony would obviously help explain why
an awake drive would drive straight into the rear-end of a truck
that is flashing its taillights.

Indeed, this testimony also would

have qualified under the pre-Rules " necessity " standard governing
expert proof.

Thus, the trial court's rejection

0:

this proof as

unhelpful constitutes an abuse of discretion .
31.

The

Court

of

Appeals '

foundation supporting this testimony

analysis

of

the

factual

is also problematic.

Court stated:

[T]he theory is premised on the fact that a driver must
be awake in order to be so " lured."
Plaintiff ' s own
11

The

expert admitted that there was no conclusive way to
determine Stephen Ostler ' s state of consciousness prior
to the accident.
Nor does the theory necessarily
establish causation because plaintiff ' s expert conceded
there was no evidence of the factors triggering the moth
phenomenon.
Id .

(emphasis added).

tiff

was

32.

This analysis commits two mistakes .

not

required

to

establish

consciousness "conc lusive[ly] ."

steven

First, plain-

Ostler 's

state

of

As the relevance of the proffered

testimony was conditional upon proof of Ostler's consciousness, the
trial

judge's preliminary factual determination was governed by

Rule l04(b).

Under that provision , a proponent need only establish

a prima facie case with respect to the underlying fact at issue
(e.g. Ostler's state of consciousness).

Rule l04(b) is designed to

protect against judges removing a matter from the jury ' s domain
whenever the court is not personally persuaded of the existence of

12

\

certain facts . '

In the present case , however, that is precisely

what occurred.
33.

Furthermore , the Court of Appeals mistakenly emphasized the

apparent concession by appellant ' s expert .

I n so doing , the Court

overlooked the fact that appellant cited other portions of the
expert ' s testimony supporting application of the moth phenomenon to
this case.

another

J'.DDellan t ' s substitute Brief,

expert

also

testified

that

the

at 4- 5.

In addition,

foundational

factors

'Of course, courts routinely preclude evidence from jury
consideration when making competency determinations under Rule
104(a). Thus , for example, witness competency i s governed by Rule
104 (a).
But the question of ,,'itness competency remains distinct
from the relevance of his testimony, which is determined by Rule
104 (b) .
Though courts rarely mention Rule 104(b) in resolving factual
questions involving expert testimony , the approach outlined above
best r eflects the theory underlying Rule 702: weaknesses in an
expert ' s position are to be developed on cross - examination.
Cf.
Coleman v.
De Minico, 730 F.2d 42, 45 - 47
(1st cir. 1984 )
( s us~aining admissibility of expert testimony based on incomplete
factual record and noting that facts at issue " do not lend
themselves to precise quantificat ion " ); Sinaer v . E . I du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 579 F . 2d 433, (8 th Cir . 1978) (court rejected attack
on expi2:-t testimony as speculative; this "attack must be viewed in

light of the
testimony.

new Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert
While an opinion still 'rises no higher than the
level of evidence and the logic upon which it is predicated , I it is

now for
the
jury,
with the assistance
of vigorous crossexamination, to measure the \,,'ort:h of the opinion " ) i Hurst v. United

States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989) ( " A trial court should
exclude expert testimony only if it is so fundamentally unsupported
tha~ it cannot help the factf inder " ) ; Snvder v. ..'hi ttaker CorD. ,
839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) ( " that these f a cts [supporting
expert testimony)
were thin" could be attacked on crossexamination); United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, 578 F.2d 156 ,
15S - 160 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Rule 104(b) to expert testimony) .

13

supporting this theory were present.
my

judgment,

the

moth

phenomenon

Transcript, at 278 -281.
is

supported

by

prima

In

facie

evidence.
34 .
fully

Although the Court of Appeals may not have been made

aware of the complete factual

record, 5 the commission of

error is further indicated by the Court's affirmance of the trial
judge not"' ithstanding appellees having opened the door to such
proof by their own trial tactics.
35 .
phenomenon,

After rejecting appellant's evidence on the moth
the

trial

judge

allowed

defendant-appellees

to

introduce extensive proof concerning the ability of an awake driver
to

stop

before

hitting

a

truck parked

in

the

emergency

lane.

Aooellant's Substitute Brief , at 19-20; ADpellant ' s ReDlv Brief, at
10-12.

As this evidence necessarilv assumed an awake driver, the

trial court should have permitted plaintiff to introduce the "moth
phenomenon" in rebuttal.
side

of

the

picture.

Failure to do so gave the jury only one
Thus ,

prejudicial

error

occurred.

Cf .

Breidor v . Sea:::-s, Roebuck & Co. , 722 F.2d 1134, 1140 -4 1 (3rd Cir.
1983)

(in reve:::-sing fo:::- failure to admit expert testimony, Court

characterized evidence as "crucial" because of the need to rebut
5Appellant 's briefs summarized the evidence supporting Ostler's
awakeness, but did not specify that two experts testified to the
adequacy of the factual foundation.
The appellate opinion,
however, recognizes that testimony from two experts was excluded.
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15. In addition, appellant 's references to
the record included pages containing "moth phenomenon" testimony
from both experts. Apoellant ' s substitute Brief, at 3 -5.
14

opponent ' s proof); MurDhv v. Maanolia Electric Power Association ,
639

F.2d

evidence

232,

235

struck

Dannenbera ,

906

at
F.2d

(5th

Cir.

the

heart

1253 ,

1981)
of

1257

( " exclusion
appellants '

(8th

Cir.

of

the

district

court I s

evidence to the contrary) .
1~7-1~8

(198~).

subsequent

II

[rebuttal )

case " );

1990)

expert testimony constitutes reversible error I

light

of

Fox

v.

(exclusion

0:

especially .

admission "

of

in

e>:pert

See aenerallv McCormick on Evidence

The Court of Appeals opinion , however, never even

addresses this issue.
VI
The sanctions Issue
36.
sanctions

are

Given the preceding analysis , I do not believe that
warranted

in

this

case .

Objectively

reasonable

grounds supported Mr. DeBry ' s decision to ask the Court of Appeals
to reconsider its rUling.
37 .

Admittedly, Mr. DeBry chose an unorthodox method to

petition the Court for reconsideration.

However, given the failure

of his initial appeal, he obviously felt the need to do something
that would get the Court 1 s
t.hat function.

at~ention.

The Hanna affidavit achieved

In addition, as a motion for rehearing ordinarily

does not afford counsel the opportunity to address numerous issues ,
the Hanna affidavit gave Mr. DeEry a vehicle for presenting a wide
var iety of evidentiary lssues.

These issues, in my judgment, '.'ere

not frivolous.
15

38.

Moreover, I agree with the views expressed by Dean

Thurmond in his

affidavit.

Gi ven

both the ser iousness

of the

issues at hand and the extent of injuries incurred by his client,
it was not unprofessional for Mr. DeBry to take the extreme measure
of

filing

an extra-record affidavit.

Rule

and

11

its various

counterparts were not intended to chill creative advocacy.
39.

For

more

than

a

decade,

I

have

students the need to become "can do" lalo.'Yers.

stressed

to

my

Too many attorneys

approach the law in a Io.' ooden and mechanical manner.

The quality of

legal representation -- and ultimately the quality of justice
See A.

suffer as a result.
Times

2~3

(1978)

Schlesinger,

(recounting

an

Robert Kennedv and

incident

in

which

~is

Kennedy

criticized the "can't do" lawyers on his staff)
~

o.

Whether

the

Court

agrees

with

hi s

~

~.

l..aCL...1CS,

Mr.

DeBry ' s submission of the Hanna affidavit is an effort at "can do"

lalo.'Yering .

Unorthodox methods do not allo.'ays succeed but, so long

as they are supported by objectively reasonable grounds, sanctions
should not be imposed for such advocacy .
_ ~L..
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)
)

RALPH OSTLER,

)
)
)

Appellant,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,
Respondents.

MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE
AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION;
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

)
)
)
)

)

Case No: 880228-CA

)
)

--------------------------)-------------------------Appellant, Ralph Ostler, respectfully moves this court to
recall the mandate and to correct its prior opinion in this case
(781 P.2d 445).
Appellant further moves to consolidate this motion with
the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J. DeBrv in his capacity
as Counsel for Plaintiff Ra l ph Ostler (case No. 910246-CA) filed on
May 3, 1991DATED this

02/

day of June, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorn y f
Appellant

0
//
aOvert c=l /?'57~
I

By:

~

ROBERT J. (S.EBRY

(

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing MOTION TO RECALL THE

K~~DATE

AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION

AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed,
postage prepaid, this ~ I

day of June, 1991, to the following :

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

0566-157\jn

2

APPENDIX 11

ALEO
AUG

~;::.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
- - - - 00000 - - - -

Albina Transfer Co . , Inc.
F <. R Roe, Inc. , and Stanley E.
Wheeler,
I

Petitioners,
v.
Robert J. DeBry, In His
Capacity as Counsel for Ralph
Ostler,
Respondents .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

5 1991

~C~

lJIsJt CoU!'\ of AppM!s

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

)
)

Case No.

910246-CA

F I L E D
(August 5, 1991 )

)
)
)
)

Origi n al Proceeding in th is Court
Attorneys:

M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Petitioners
Robert J. DeBry, Sa l t Lake City, fo r Respondents

Before Judges Billings, Garff,

and Ru sson (Law and Motion) .

Petitioners 1 filed a petition in this court seeking
sanctions against Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as counsel
fo r Ralph Ostler in an earlier appea l.
That appeal culminated
in the opinion r e po r ted at 781 P . 2d 445 ( Utah App . 1989 ) , ~.
denied, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 1990).
Respondent Robert
J. DeBry filed a response to the pet iti on and the following
motions:
1.

Mot ion To Recall The Mandate and To
Correct The Opinion; a nd Motion To
Consol ida te

2.

Moti o n To Seal The Record

1.
Petitioners uS'2d the '.:a pti')11 Cl.'.'''' th'2 ':'r ioinal a ppeal.
f il ed by Ralph Os tl '2r, as the 'capti.')" fnr 1:.!Jeir pleadings.
That appeal was culminated over a year befo re the present
petitio n was filed.
The petition is, accordingly, considered
as an or iginal proceeding filed in this court and the caption
has been adjusted to reflect th a t fact.

3.

Motion To File Supplemental Affidavit In
Support of Memorandum In Opposition To
Petition For Sanctions Against Robert J.
DeBry As Counsel For Plaintiff Ralph
Ostler

This court's initial inquiry must be whether there is a
basis for jurisdiction to determine the petition for
sanctions. The appellate process, including action on the
petition for writ o f certiorari, has been concluded for over a
year.
Accordingly, we consider the petition as an original
proceeding in this court.
The petition does not contain a
jurisdictional statement and purportedly relies upon Rule 33 of
t he utah Rules o f Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules o f Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 27-56 (1991
Supp.) as the basis for the claim. While those provisions
pertain tO , the substanti ve claim, they do not state a basis for
jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 2a - 3(1990) describes this court's
subject matter jurisdiction.
Subsection (1) describes this
court ' s original, as opposed to appellate, jurisdict i on. 2 The
petitioners have not cited any provis i on of section 78 - 2a - 3(1)
as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the petition
for sanctions. Similarly, they have not confo r med their
petition to the pleading requirements of Utah R. App . P. 19
pertaining to petitions for extraordinary writs, nor do they
characterize the petition as being filed under that rule.
The request for sanctions should have been made while
the appeal was pending. 3 Petitioners argue, however, that the
acts complained of occurred after this court's opinion issued,
in connection with the petition for rehearing and petition for
2 . Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a - 3(1) provides:
"The Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all writs and process
necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and
decrees; o r (b) in aid of its jurisdiction. "
3.
The procedure for seeking sanctions on appeal was clarified
in amendments to Utah R. App. P. 33, and Utah R . App. P. 40
that became effective in April of 1990.
Ru le 33(c)(1)
provides,

in part,

" p.., pClrty 111::'l -~-

I · r:~l~lle.st

f.1;:1nl;'~l ~s

l1nd er

t his rule

only as part o f tile 8[.lpellee· S 1fI,_,ti'_" , (<:' t 3ullllllary dispcsi tion
under Rule 10, as part of the "ppellee's brief, or as part of a
party ' s response to a motion or ot her paper. " Rule 40
incorporates the procedures of Rule 33 by reference.

910246-CA
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writ of ce rti orar i.
This court did not call for a response to
the petition for rehearing.
Peti t ioners, however, filed
respo n ses to the petition for writ of certiorari on January 15
and January 25, 1990. Neither response included a request for
sanctions.
Petitioners filed a motion to strike the Hanna
affidavit in February, 1990, and again did not request
sa nct i ons, although they were successfu l i n obtaining a ruling
by the Utah Supreme Co urt striking the affidavit. A petition
for s ancti o ns was filed in the trial court ten months after th e
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. The claim for
sanctions was ripe. at the very least, dur i ng pro ceedings in
the Utah Supreme Court . Issuance of the remittitur ended this
court's jurisdiction to consider the claim for sanctions on
appeal .
We dismiss the petition for sanctions for lack of
jurisd icti on . On the same basis. we deny the motions to recall
mandate. to consolidate the present petition with the o riginal
appeal . and t o supplement the response to the petition . We
further deny the motion to seal the records of this court in
the o riginal appeal and in the proceedi ng s on this petition .

A(:t~~R :

~m.

Judit
8i lings. ,
Ass c i ate P _S~JUd

R

nal

. Garff. Judge

II '

ef'$. -~/..4C4J
~/,.

»

Leonard H. Russ on. Judge
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COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE :
Albina Transfer Company, Inc.;
F & R Roe, Inc . ; and Stanley E.
\-Iheeler ,
Petitioners,
v
Robert J. DeBry , in His Capacity
as Counsel for Ralph Ostler,
Respondents.
August 5,

1991.

MEMOP~NDUM

Case No.

910246 - CA

DECISION (Not For PUblication) .

opinion of the Court by PER CURIAM.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of August, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing 11EMORll.NDUM DECISION ,·Ias
deposited in the United St a tes mail to each of the parties
listed below:
M. Dayle Jeffs
Jeffs & Jeffs
Attorneys at Law
90 Nort h 100 East
P . O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
Robert J. DeBry
Attorneys at Law
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84107

J/.
II) /; It

Deputy
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APPENDIX 12

Art. V III , § 2

CONSTITUTIO:\ OF L"TAH

Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of su preme court.]
The supreme court shall have o,iginal jurisdicLion
to issue all extraordinary ''''Tits and to answer questions of SLaLe law certified by a coun of the United
States. The supreme court shall have appellate juris·
diction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute. and power to issue all writs and

orders necessary for the exe:-cise of the supremE'
coun's jurisdiction or Lhe compl~L~ determination of
any cause.

1985
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78·2--4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1 ) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce·
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage t he appellate process. Th e
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two· thirds of all members of both houses of t he
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con·
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justi ces and judges and judges pro tempore to
perfonn any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The S upreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and di scipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
1986
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R ule 46. Consideration s governing revi ew of certiorari.

i

0'
j

'I
i

\
\
1

Re\"iew by a wrjt of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted onl Y for special and important reasons . The following, while neith er controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion. indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a ) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decisior. of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjuclicial proceed ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Coun's power of supervision; or
(dl When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal , state , or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

